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introduction
American journalists have a major responsibility: working on democracy’s free
press to inform citizens and officials about local, national and world events as
well as to provide a measure of public accountability for all institutions and their
members. In June 2002, a number of prominent journalists, publishers, news
executives and deans of journalism and communications schools came to a day-
long Carnegie Corporation forum to discuss a concern raised by many of us;
namely, that the nation’s truly admirable journalism profession currently lacks
sufficient tools to do its work—and, hence, democracy’s work—in a competitive
environment of parsimonious corporate support and expanding global complexity.
Globalization imposes on journalists the increasing burden of making
sense of interlocking or interdependent histories, economies, laws, cultures and
conflicts in a “news cycle” now spinning at Internet speed. The Information
Revolution—and journalists are front and center in this revolution—makes it
enormously easier for journalists to obtain information, but not correspondingly
easier for them to separate the chaff from the wheat, subjectivity from objectivity,
opinion from fact, private interests from public interests, manipulation from
influence and corruption from “spin.” The Information Revolution, globalization
and media industry trends—including corporate consolidations, ever-present
commercialism and “infotainment”—make it more and more difficult for jour-
nalists to cover the news and provide sophisticated analysis, synthesis and context.
Even leaving aside the corporate issues, it is clear that the complexities of modern
society, global development and the Information Revolution place unprecedented
demands on the profession of journalism. But it is not so clear whether our grad-
uate and undergraduate programs in journalism provide adequate intellectual and
technical preparation to meet these challenges.  
In the past, the prevalent view was that the quickest way to learn about
an issue is to cover it—never mind that turnover in assignments often means that
no sooner has a reporter or editor achieved a level of expertise than he or she
hands it over to a relative newcomer to the issue. If, as many agree, that system
was wearing thin in the 20th century, it certainly isn’t adequate in the 21st. 
Journalism, the quintessential knowledge profession, deserves the best-
educated and trained practitioners, in my view. Or more bluntly, as Loren
Ghiglione, dean of the Medill School of Journalism, told the Chicago Tribune:
“We need a new paradigm for what a good journalist does. The old paradigm was
that any good reporter can do a good job of covering any subject, regardless of
how complicated it is. The new paradigm says: ‘Wouldn’t it be good if people
really knew what they were writing about?’”  
Journalism, after all, has to help us cope with the info-glut. The total
amount of collected information is said to double every two or three years, and yet
we are told that we’re unable to use 90 to 95 percent of the information on hand.
As Richard Saul Wurman writes in his book, Information Anxiety (Doubleday,
1989), “We are like a thirsty person who has been condemned to use a thimble
to drink from a fire hydrant.”
The info-glut’s implications for journalism—and thus democracy—are
Orwellian. In 1984, George Orwell described a world in which information was
scarce, knowledge was denied and propaganda was substituted for both. In the
21st century, the risk is the same but the process is different: denying citizens
knowledge by inundating them with “megabytes, gigabytes and terabytes” of
undigested information. 
Thus, the importance of ensuring journalism’s success in meeting today’s
challenges—finding knowledge in information—cannot be overstated, for failure
leaves our democracy open to massive manipulation, distortion and denial of citi-
zens’ ability to make real choices as autonomous beings. As Thomas Jefferson
wrote in 1816, “A nation that expects to be ignorant and free expects what never
was and never will be.” Put another way,  James Madison said, “I believe there are
more instances of the abridgment of the freedom of the people by gradual and
silent encroachments of those in power than by violent and sudden usurpations.”
As a society, however, we do not put a lot of trust in journalism, ranking
journalists just below “rich people” and just above “government officials” in a
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recent public opinion survey by CNN/USA Today/Gallup. Indeed our ambiva-
lence about journalists is comparable to our ambivalence about teachers and
librarians. While many people pay lip service to the need for a free press, public
education and libraries—saying they are essential sources of information and
knowledge and, thus, essential to the security and health of our democracy—
most of us rarely pay any attention to the needs of these idealized professions. We
routinely take these practitioners for granted, but are very quick to criticize shal-
low reporting, ineffective teaching and weak librarianship. A dialogue in Tom
Stoppard’s 1978 play, Night and Day, captures this ambivalence: “Milne: ‘No
matter how imperfect things are, if you’ve got a free press everything is cor-
rectable, and without it everything is conceivable.’ Ruth: ‘I’m with you on the
free press. It’s the newspapers I can’t stand.’”
These three professions—in particular, the education and training for
their practitioners—are of particular interest to Carnegie Corporation of New
York, which was founded by Andrew Carnegie in 1911 “to promote the advance-
ment and diffusion of knowledge and understanding,” a mission that Carnegie
believed in passionately because of his deeply held conviction that ideas can
change the world for the better.
When asked about the quality of their professional preparation and their
related ability to spread knowledge and understanding, journalists were character-
istically critical and unsparing of themselves in recent surveys: 
• Nearly three out of four journalists say they are not well prepared to
cover the most important issues facing the country. They grade journal-
ists’ preparation a “3” on a scale of “1” to “5,” with “1” being poor and
“5” being excellent. Similarly, most of the surveyed journalists rate the
overall quality of reporting as a “3.” John E. Cox, Jr., president of the
Foundation for American Communications, which commissioned the
study, underlined its findings: “This survey shows that journalists them-
selves believe they need more education and training to do a better job
of covering the news.” (American Opinion Research conducted the
survey, which was sponsored by the David and Lucille Packard
Foundation.)
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• One in three journalists is dissatisfied with professional development
opportunities at work, and this complaint is more common than ones
about pay, benefits, promotion or even job security. Most journalists say
they need training in work skills, content areas and ethics, values and
legal issues—but few news staffers say they receive training in these
areas. Nine out of ten news executives agree about the desirability of
better training, but they say financial and time constraints severely limit
training opportunities—on an annual average, per employee, to no
more than several days and no more than $500. Most companies spend
one percent or less of their news budget on training, and ten percent of
the companies spend nothing on training. The greatest need for training
was cited by staffers in local television newsrooms. Beverly Kees, the
survey’s editor at Princeton Survey Research Associates, commented:
“Though news organizations are in the knowledge business, the news
industry lags behind others in providing its people with new knowledge
and skills through professional training.” (The Council of Presidents of
National Journalism Organizations commissioned the survey and the
John S. and James L. Knight Foundation sponsored it.)
• Nearly two in three editors responsible for international news say their
newspaper’s coverage is fair or poor—and they said television networks’
foreign coverage was worse. These editors also said their own news
organizations do a fair or poor job of satisfying readers’ interest in inter-
national news. Although international news coverage increased at most
of the surveyed newspapers after September 11th,  the editors expect
that coverage will gradually return to prior levels, with most publica-
tions allotting foreign news 10 percent or less of  the space for all news.
(Dwight L. Morris & Associates conducted the survey for the Pew
International Journalism Program.) 
Of particular interest to the Corporation is a current discussion about
whether our journalism programs are preparing “reporters,” who are skilled in
gathering and packaging information, or “journalists,” who have additional abili-
ties for investigation, analysis, synthesis, perspective and narration. Because of
journalists’ importance to our society, I believe that the level of their education,
the level of their sophistication and the level of their knowledge about the issues
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that they report on must be high in order to prevent them from being marginal-
ized, sidelined or manipulated. We need, as much as possible, an unshakable,
untouchable independence and integrity from journalists because, as a society, we
are dependent on them not only for information but for context about the infor-
mation they bring us and for expanding how we think about and analyze the life
of our nation, our relationships with our allies and enemies, and events taking
place in the most far-flung corners of the world.
Yet as globalization and the Information Revolution increase the pressure
for journalists to become specialists in different areas, I believe we must not
devalue generalists or ignore their demands for better education and continued
training. After all, we live in an age of extraordinary specialization and fragmenta-
tion of knowledge, spawning specializations, sub-specializations and sub-sub-spe-
cializations in every discipline. This division of labor, of course, has been of great
value in promoting progress in our society. Complexity, by necessity, requires spe-
cialization. 
So we need specialists in journalism, as well. But for greater understand-
ing, we also need generalists, educated and cultivated, trained and knowledgeable
in the humanities, arts, sciences and social sciences. The challenge is to provide
synthesis. We also need generalists’ help in creating a common discourse, a com-
mon vocabulary for discussing various disciplines. Today, more than ever, we must
try to balance technical studies in reporting skills with a general and liberal edu-
cation. In addition, we need a moral balance—informed by the study of ethics,
history and culture—that teaches us the difference between making a living and
actually living, between means and ends, and between the individual and society. 
James W. Carey, professor at Columbia University’s Graduate School of
Journalism, makes a crucial point when he writes: “The natural academic home
of journalism is among the humanities and the humanistic social sciences.
Journalism belongs with political theory, which nurtures an understanding of
democratic life and institutions; with literature, from which it derives a heightened
awareness of language and expression and an understanding of narrative form;
with philosophy, from which it can clarify its own moral foundations; with art,
which enriches its capacity to imagine the unity of the visual world; with history,
which forms the underlying stratum of its consciousness.”
The value of a good liberal arts education, moreover, is its ability to
enhance a journalist’s powers of rational analysis, intellectual precision, independent
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judgment and mental adaptability—a characteristic sorely needed, especially now
in an era of rapid change. A liberal education also will help journalism students to
become familiar with the best our culture has taught, said and done—as well as the
dead ends and aberrations that clutter our history. It may help young journalists to
know and understand the sweep of our culture, the complex nature of our society,
the achievements, the problems, the solutions and the failures that mark our history. 
I also believe that a liberal education would enable journalists to inte-
grate learning and provide balance in a world where dependence on experts of
every kind is increasingly more common. With that trend comes an even greater
temptation to abdicate judgment in favor of expert opinion—or be hopelessly
lost amid conflicting expert opinions. Unless we help our journalism students
acquire their own identities, they will end up not just dependent on experts but
may end up at the mercy of experts—or worse, at the mercy of charlatans posing
as experts.
A one-day dialogue between educators and business leaders falls far short
of answering the large questions facing the profession, but the tensions that grip
an industry in the midst of change, diminishing profits and complicated demands
were apparent in the conversations that filled the day. I believe raising the kinds
of serious questions about the news business that surfaced in this forum is critical
even though no specific conclusions were reached, if for no other reason than
those who are shaping the next generation of America’s journalists must not exist
in a vacuum but always be aware of the real-world needs and demands of those
who will employ their graduates. Educators in America’s schools of journalism and
communications produce the men and women making the decisions about what
America reads and watches. They shape those who determine what is news and
what is not. And because these same educators also judge and award the national
prizes that validate the work of the news industry, the educators must also ask
critical questions that challenge and provoke the profession out of its status quo.
Publishers and broadcasters, also, must be involved in this process, not remain
aloof from it, because journalism is not a business alone, it is a public trust. This
report on the Carnegie Forum on journalism captures a dialogue we hope will
continue in classrooms throughout the country as the news business begins a new
century of serving as the front line of American democracy. 
Journalists have served our nation well. So have many courageous pub-
lishers who put the national interest above their own parochial interests. Today, it
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is apparent that journalism is straining under increasing corporate, educational
and socio-economic pressures. Equally apparent, it is in our democracy’s interest
to confront these challenges and help solve as many as we can. Journalists, after
all, are America’s eyes and ears and often the voice of its conscience. As Arthur
Miller once wrote, “A good newspaper, I suppose, is a nation talking to itself.”
Vartan Gregorian
President, Carnegie Corporation of New York
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Vartan Gregorian previously served as president of Brown University and, earlier, as president of
the New York Public Library and provost of the University of Pennsylvania.  As a young man,
he was a contributing journalist to major Armenian newspapers in Iran, where he grew up.

By the closing weeks of summer 2001, a malaise was spreading in many
American newsrooms. The economic downturn had intensified, but around the
country there were signs of something deeper and more pervasive than cyclical
anxiety about lowered ad revenues. At newspapers in the Knight-Ridder chain,
divisiveness over profit-margin mandates spilled into the open after San Jose
Mercury News publisher Jay Harris resigned rather than implement the latest
round of headquarters-ordered newsroom budget cuts; when he told his story
from the podium a few weeks later at the annual American Society of Newspaper
Editors meeting, Harris received a standing ovation. At The Washington Post,
executive editor Leonard Downie, Jr., and associate editor Robert G. Kaiser were
completing their book The News About the News: American Journalism in Peril
(Knopf, 2002), an examination of the consequences of increasing profit pressures
and changing values at newspaper and broadcast companies around the country.
The American Journalism Review had for two years been running a series of
lengthy, specially commissioned reports on the state of American newspapers; the
just-released hardbound collection of the articles carried the gloomy title Leaving
Readers Behind: The Age of Corporate Newspapers. 
The most commonly voiced laments—that satisfying shareholders has
become more important than serving the community, that entertainment and
scandal are gutting serious news, that foreign bureaus and ambitious investigative
reporting are now regarded as costly frivolities—were silenced, for a while, by the
extraordinary mandates of covering September 11. In most news organizations
around the country, the terrorist attacks and their aftermath so thoroughly clarified
the mission of journalism that many reporters and editors described the particular
exhilaration of understanding exactly what the job is:  the searching for vital
information, the explaining of the unfamiliar, the shedding of light. Over the
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ensuing weeks the catchall phrase “the
public interest” seemed temporarily less
elusive, as news publications and television
networks threw every available resource
into a story with massive national and
international repercussions. 
Nine months later, with the
momentum of September 11 greatly
diminished but not yet dissipated,
Carnegie Corporation of New York invited
40 news leaders to gather in Manhattan
for a one-day conference on the public
interest in the business of news. The impe-
tus for this gathering came from several
venues at once. Long before September 11,
Vartan Gregorian, the president of the
Corporation and the former president of Brown University, had been growing
increasingly interested in the relationship between journalism and the public life
essential to continued democracy. Over the previous two years, in a series of four
Corporation-supported gatherings in New York and California, journalists and
academic leaders had been talking over the role of training and education in the
development of journalists. After September 11, the challenge of thinking through
and improving that training took on a new urgency, and the Corporation began
planning an expanded version of those journalism education conversations. 
Then, last spring, Orville Schell, dean of the University of California at
Berkeley’s (UCB) Graduate School of Journalism, invited a group of journalism
and communication school deans to Berkeley to see whether they might collec-
tively examine the state of television news in this country, with special attention
to the effects of deregulation and the public interest in the airwaves. The
Corporation suggested that the deans incorporate their discussions into the
broader forum Gregorian had in mind. The gathering that resulted, on June 19,
2002, brought together deans, editors, journalists, publishers, broadcast heads,
media consultants and foundation executives, all grouped around a massive rec-
tangle of tables for a six-hour conversation that ranged from the sweeping (Is
quality journalism in peril?) to the definitional (What do we think “quality journal-
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ism” is?) to the tactical (Is it fair to single out broadcast television for critique?). The
meeting was moderated by Corporation public affairs vice president Susan King. 
The sendoffs for the day’s conversation were delivered by Vartan
Gregorian, who exhorted the participants “to discuss frankly the state of the pro-
fession,” and by CNN anchor and Corporation trustee Judy Woodruff, who
offered up what she described as the “front and center” questions for the day—and
for journalists around the country. Some of the broad challenges Woodruff posed
were to permeate much of the discussion that followed:
• Has making money become the primary goal of too many news opera-
tions? As more and more news organizations are taken over by publicly
traded companies, Woodruff asked, “Does the bottom line not just mat-
ter, as always—but does it dominate?”
• Did September 11 teach us anything that will endure? “After one of
journalism’s finest hours,” Woodruff asked, “are we returning to the values
of September 10?  Among other things, is international news still valued?”
• What can journalists do besides simply complaining about the primacy
of the bottom line? “When these important business decisions are being
made, affecting the public’s right to know, are journalists sitting at the
table?” Woodruff asked. “And if they are, are they speaking up?”
Newspapers and the Public Interest 
Leonard Downie, Jr., whose book The News About the News had been distributed
to the conference participants, extended Woodruff ’s questions directly into con-
temporary American newspaper operations, where many journalism graduates
will look for their first jobs. “On September 12, all across America, many people
who don’t regularly read a newspaper bought a copy and devoured it,” Downie
said. “It was a reminder why even now, decades into the electronic era, newspa-
pers remain so important…Television and newspapers both perform important
public services, but they aren’t the same ones. TV brings great events directly to
the public, allowing everyone to participate vicariously in the making of history.
The mission of newspapers is to bring a rich, detailed, contextual account of these
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events, and much more, to their readers every day, enabling them to remain in
touch with their communities, the country and the world.”
But that weighty mandate is now being ignored at too many papers,
Downie stated. Despite the surge of fine reporting after September 11, he said, a
survey of modern newsrooms produces much to worry about over the longer
term.  News staffs and news holes are shrinking in tandem. Foreign and govern-
ment coverage is decreasing or disappearing altogether. Newsroom managers—
not just publishers, but also the very editors whose primary interest ought to be
in delivering news to the reading public—are finding their own pay linked to
profit goals and stock price increases. “The message coming down from too many
owners and publishers has been that improvements in the bottom line are a higher
priority, often a much higher priority, than improvements in journalism,” Downie
said. “Scorched-earth cuts in news have become routine in down advertising
years, with increasing expectations and even public declarations that these cuts
will not be restored in the up years.”
Downie and Kaiser’s book includes some case studies of newsrooms and
4 •  THE BUSINESS OF NEWS
“As more and more news organizations are taken over by pub-
licly traded companies,” CNN Anchor Judy Woodruff asked,
“Does the bottom line not just matter, as always—but does it
dominate?”
Loren Ghiglione, Kevin Klose and Leonard Downie, Jr.
news corporations, both those the authors found admirable and those that seemed
to exemplify the priority shifts that alarm them. Journalism programs and inter-
ested foundations might now want to undertake more detailed inquiries, Downie
suggested, with an eye toward the larger answers that might result from such spe-
cific case studies as these:
Gannett. This publicly-held company owns scores of newspapers, ensur-
ing high profit margins by exerting strong central control over the busi-
ness and journalism at each. When Gannett takes over newspapers, the
journalism tends to sag, Downie said, with the news holes dropping and
the best reporters and editors leaving in disappointment as ambitious
reporting is discouraged. 
Downie’s proposals for study: What affect do these changes have
on the communities in which they occur? Since regional Gannett news-
papers often provide starting jobs for young reporters, how is the future
of the profession influenced by the low pay and minimal journalistic
ambition at these papers?
Knight Ridder. As the owner of what have in the past been some of the
nation’s most admired big-city newspapers, including The Philadelphia
Inquirer and the San Jose Mercury News, this publicly-held corporation
has recently come under intense criticism in media circles—often by its
own disenchanted former editors and reporters. The national attention
to publisher Jay Harris’ resignation was only one eruption in an ongoing
series of complaints about newsroom budget cuts that critics contend
represent a fundamental change in company priorities. Knight Ridder
executives, including CEO Tony Ridder, have objected heatedly to this
assertion, saying the papers’ staffing is still better than the industry norm
and that satisfying shareholders is essential to keeping the newspapers
alive.
Downie’s proposal for study: Who’s right? Is there a relationship
between news budget and news hole cuts at the Inquirer and Miami
Herald, and drops in those papers’ circulation? What are, or should be,
acceptable profit margins for a newspaper company?
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The McClatchy Company. This family-controlled public company owns
well-regarded papers in midsize cities: the Minneapolis Star Tribune, for
example, and the Bee papers in California (Sacramento, Modesto and
Fresno). Downie observed that although the company is expanding, like
Gannett and others, current CEO Gary Pruitt has declared that he intends
to improve the papers by investing in their newsrooms. 
Downie’s proposal for study: Does Pruitt mean it? What’s the
difference between the journalism-profit balance at McClatchy and that
of other chains? How might the cultures of the various companies be
compared? 
Tribune Company. Former Times Mirror papers that have now been
taken over by the Tribune Company—The Baltimore Sun, Newsday and
The Los Angeles Times—are showing interesting signs of journalistic
improvement even as their new corporate managers try to maintain high
profits while running a diversified media company. 
Downie’s proposal for study: Will these encouraging signs con-
tinue? How will plans develop for new Los Angeles Times editor John
Carroll, who, along with new managing editor Dean Baquet, has been
warmly received by a newsroom that had been recently demoralized by
some well-publicized publisher missteps? What will the Tribune Company
do with The Baltimore Sun, and with what must now be overlapping
national and international bureaus serving the various papers?
Newhouse. This private, family-controlled company, owner of such
papers as the Newark Star-Ledger and the Portland Oregonian, has
recently mounted a newsroom improvement campaign, Downie said—
explicitly urging its editors to attend to good journalism rather than
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One of the central points of discussion will have to be the impor-
tance of finding a balance between the business of journalism and
journalism itself, said Leonard Downie, Jr., executive editor of
The Washington Post. 
higher profit margins. He quoted Doug Clifton, who defected from
Knight Ridder’s Miami Herald to Newhouse’s Cleveland Plain Dealer, as
saying the management atmosphere at his new paper feels “totally differ-
ent” than it did at the one he left in Miami. At the Portland Oregonian,
Downie said, editor Sandra Mims Rowe has declared that she doesn’t
even know what the newspaper’s overall budget is, that she knows only
what she has been given to work with in the newsroom.  
Downie’s proposal for study: What difference does family owner-
ship make to newsroom culture and to the journalism a paper produces?
What’s happened to circulation and to regional credibility at the papers
Newhouse has been encouraging to improve?
The St. Petersburg Times. Published by the nonprofit Poynter Institute,
a legacy of the late Times owner Nelson Poynter, the Times is now
“arguably the best newspaper in Florida,” Downie said, with an emphasis
on strong local reporting, aggressive government coverage and very good
writing. Downie quoted Poynter outgoing chairman Andy Barnes as
having said he thinks 10 percent profit is not enough to run a newspaper,
but that 20 percent is too much. 
Downie’s proposal for study:  Are these journalistic achievements,
coupled with this liberation from the profit demands of shareholders,
the natural consequence of nonprofit ownership?  Should this be tried
elsewhere?  Is it farfetched to suggest that the very wealthy try buying
newspapers and running them as nonprofits?
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Louis Boccardi, Stephen Jukes and Thomas Kunkel
Downie concluded
with a call for organ-
ized dialogue among
editors, publishers and
owners—which seems
obvious, he said, but
has so far been diffi-
cult to undertake
because editors have
been afraid of being
rebuffed. Foundations
and universities can
help in these conversa-
tions, he said, perhaps
by convening regularly scheduled meetings and issuing public reports about the
specific challenges now facing American newspapers. And one of the central
points of discussion, Downie said, will have to be the importance of finding a
balance between the business of journalism and journalism itself. Nobody expects
newspapers to operate without making money, Downie stated. The arguments are
over how much. Downie himself, he noted, has become “a little famous” for
remarking, when asked what he thought a reasonable profit margin might be,
that he agreed with Barnes about how a 15 percent average sounded about right.
“There’s big, big disagreement about that between many editors and
many owners nowadays,” Downie said, adding his opinion that, “the reader-citi-
zen is who we all really work for, even more than advertisers, shareholders or cor-
porate executives. Newspapers are not like any other business.”  
That last assertion—what Richard Tofel, corporate communications vice
president for Dow Jones &. Co., called “the religious question”—was central to
the lively argument that followed Downie’s presentation. Several key themes
emerged from this discussion:
Do journalists understand “profit” as well as they should?
Not really, said Jack Fuller, the president of Tribune Publishing, who told Downie
he thought the whole journalistic community was skewing the discussion without
a proper understanding of the larger economic picture at newspaper-owning
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companies. “You’re almost as fixated on profit margins as Wall Street,” Fuller said.
“The metric of ‘margin’ is too simple to fix on. There are many other things that
are involved in margins that have nothing to do with newsroom expense.”
At the Chicago Tribune, for example, Fuller said he had gone back over
twenty years of recent economic history and found enormous increases in profit
margins—while the percentage spent on newsrooms also increased. “Margin is
driven by improving the expense picture outside of newsrooms, not necessarily by
changing the expense picture inside the newsroom,” he said.  “You know, you can
do away with your whole foreign service and save less than you can save by
changing a point or two on your newsprint widths.”
Tofel took up Fuller’s point, urging both journalism educators and work-
ing reporters to develop a more sophisticated understanding of real-world busi-
ness. Washington Post publisher Donald Graham cuts an admirable figure when
he tells stockholders he’s indifferent to short-term profits, Tofel said, adding,
“God bless him. But that’s not a public company. Because he has control, and
because if he misses his target, he still gets to be in charge and to decide who’s in
charge after him. The key thing about a public company is that if a public com-
pany underperforms over a sustained period of time, it gets taken over. And in
the news business, if a company gets taken over, the quality of the journalism
almost invariably declines.” 
Is it right to focus on certain newspaper companies for criticism or even close
scrutiny?
In certain journalism circles, especially following the Jay Harris resignation, the
Knight Ridder company has become a kind of poster child for fraying values.
Steve Rossi, president of Knight Ridder’s newspaper division, spoke up sharply in
defense of his company, taking issue both with Downie’s critique of Knight
Ridder and with the suggestion that 15 percent is an honorable newspaper profit
margin. “I think, unfortunately, that that’s dictated by shareholder expectations,”
Rossi said. “Fifteen percent doesn’t include all the expenses of running a newspaper
company. If 15 percent isn’t enough to attract investors, so that you have capital
to reinvest in the business, it doesn’t do any of us any good.”
Rossi, though, took particular exception to the insinuation—in Downie
and Kaiser’s book, as well as in other recent forums like the American Journalism
Review series—that the situation at Knight Ridder exemplifies the damage to
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good newspaper journalism when too much deference is given to shareholder
expectations. “I don’t think making incendiary and many times unsubstantiated
comments about companies is necessarily the best way to engage,” Rossi said. “I
wish we could get off Knight Ridder as a standard for bad things, because I think
there are a lot of good things.”  
There was some caustic exchange about the actual state of affairs at
Knight Ridder papers around the country. Rossi said the papers’ news hole and
newsroom headcount had increased overall throughout the 1990s, and that the
company’s best papers had continued to improve; Columbia Journalism School
professor Michael Janeway, the former dean at Northwestern’s Medill School of
Journalism, retorted that this was “an incomplete, and even unsophisticated pic-
ture.”  The newspaper business cycles up and down with the economy as a whole,
Janeway said, but news companies have shown very different ways of planning for
and reacting to the losses of recent years. “We’re seeing that differentiation in Dow
Jones, in the [New York] Times, in McClatchy,” Janeway said. “The [Washington]
Post, and I think the Tribune Company are [also] on the plus side of that differ-
entiation. To everybody who knows anything about the business, including people
in universities, Gannett and Knight Ridder are pretty clearly differentiating them-
selves into pure businesses, with the sacrifice of that prioritization that you see in
other companies.”
Alex Jones, director of the Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics,
and Public Policy, intervened diplomatically to suggest that much of the current
public critique of Knight Ridder has emanated, in fact, from the company’s tradi-
tionally excellent reputation in reporting circles—that many observers have felt a
kind of betrayal at watching such admired papers appear to falter amid changed
corporate priorities. “Knight Ridder is one of us, as far as most of us are con-
cerned,” Jones said. “Rightly or wrongly, there is a perception of something that’s
different at Knight Ridder...If a knowledgeable and genuinely sophisticated person
looked at the way things are done at Knight Ridder, and looked at the way things
are done at the Tribune Company and McClatchy, would they see significant dif-
ferences? Their perception is that they would. And perhaps that’s something that
would unlock a door here.”
Still, Rossi cautioned his colleagues at the meeting against making com-
parison studies, which he suggested can be intrinsically unfair. “What really hap-
pens is you have such distinct differences in markets,” Rossi said. 
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“I accept that,” Jones replied. “I’m not asking Knight Ridder to be com-
pared to The New York Times or The Washington Post. Where are those distinctions,
though? And do they exist between [others and] a McClatchy—which is a public
company, making decisions based on rational business criteria?”
If case studies are the right model, what are the markers to study? 
Geneva Overholser, the former Des Moines Register editor now on the University of
Missouri School of Journalism faculty, agreed with Jack Fuller that profit margins
alone are an inadequate measure of a newspaper company’s progress. “Some peo-
ple are doing an interesting thing right now, and that is trying to look at different
metrics to think about how companies are serving their communities,” she said. 
What might that mean in practice? Geoffrey Cowan, dean of the
University of Southern California (USC) Annenberg School for Communication,
suggested a few “metrics,” for comparison study or other purposes, that might be
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“The newspaper business cycles up and down with the economy
as a whole,” said Michael Janeway, professor of journalism and
director of the National Arts Journalism Program at Columbia
University’s Graduate School of Journalism, “but news compa-
nies have shown very different ways of planning for and react-
ing to the losses of recent years.”
Ellen Wartella, Michael Janeway and Geoffrey Cowan
useful for broadcast as
well: news hole size,
reporting staff size,
number of enterprise
stories, number of
award-nominated or
award-winning reports.
“But I wonder if there’s
some other kind of
metrics that could be
agreed upon,” he said,
adding that journalism
schools might help come up with those more innovative ideas for making useful
comparisons among news companies—or between one news company and itself
under a former structure or management.
The broader questions that this “metrics” suggestion implied—are we all
talking about the same thing when we throw around terms like “quality,” “serious,”
and “in the public interest”?—were to reappear throughout the afternoon, espe-
cially as the conversation moved toward broadcast news. The next speaker, address-
ing what he surely knew to be an audience dismayed about the state of broadcast
journalism, had his own understanding of what those words mean and how often
they apply to the television work he oversees. 
Broadcasting and the Public Interest
Neal Shapiro, the president of NBC News, opened the second discussion period
with what struck the rest of the room as a startlingly upbeat assessment of con-
temporary broadcast journalism. Shapiro was the only commercial broadcast
executive to attend the meeting (his predecessor Lawrence Grossman, who ran
NBC News from 1984 to 1988, was present in his capacity as co-director of the
Digital Promise Project), and he recalled that when he began his career, as the
editor of his college paper, “I remember thinking TV journalism was a colossal
waste of time, that people who did it wrote thirty minute stories anybody could
write. Clearly, I have a different view now.”
Shapiro said it was true that broadcast journalists no longer work in the
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era when television news was expected to be a money loser. “Yes, there are more
pressures; yes, there are ratings to worry about,” he said. “But I’d say we live in a
much better world today, as far as television goes.”  
The sheer volume of news now available on television, Shapiro argued,
has numbed viewers to the real enterprise and quality that exists in broadcast. Just
this year, he said, “‘Dateline’ (an NBC prime time newsmagazine), alone, will
probably do 25 serious, hour-long documentaries. That never happened before.”
The occasionally repeated dismissive comment about how the famous 1960 doc-
umentary “Harvest of Shame” could never reach broadcast television in today’s
climate, Shapiro said, is flat-out wrong. “You know what? TV did do it,” Shapiro
stated. “Three years ago. ‘Dateline’ did it. Followed a Mexican-American family
for eight months…Not only did we do it, and win almost every journalism award
you could win, it won the night. It was a commercial success.”
The definitions of “hard” and “soft” news need serious rethinking now,
Shapiro said, especially when they so commonly appear in critiques of what is
characterized as the fluff-filled airwaves. “We’ve all recognized that news goes
beyond what happened today,” he said. “News includes everything, about the dif-
ficulties of raising your child, problems in health care, questions about medicine—
all those things are legitimate things that you put in your newspaper now, that you
didn’t have in your newspaper 30 years ago. And I think that’s great. Yet somehow
when TV does that, there’s some horrible thing going on, that we sold out, that
we’re doing ‘features,’ we’re doing ‘light fluff.’”
Although there was much appreciation of Shapiro’s willingness to join
the discussion in person, he was plainly aware that he was addressing a skeptical
audience. Each of the forum participants had been presented with a draft copy of
Broadcasting and the Public Interest, a Corporation-commissioned background paper
written by Janice Hui, research associate, University of California, Berkeley; and
Craig LaMay, visiting scholar in urban affairs and policy research at Northwestern
University and a senior research associate at Northwestern`s Medill School of
Journalism. That paper, which is included in the Appendix to this report, traces
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The airwaves—limited, by the nature of the electromagnetic
spectrum—have historically been regarded as a publicly-owned
national resource.
the history of regulation and subsequent deregulation of broadcast, reminding
readers that the airwaves—limited, by the nature of the electromagnetic spec-
trum—have historically been regarded as a publicly-owned national resource.
“Most people might be surprised to learn that they, the public, own the airwaves,”
the report read. “But Congress authorized the licensing of commercial broadcast-
ers to use this scare national resource in exchange for serving ‘the public interest,
convenience and necessity.’”
The background paper reviewed much of the controversy and criticism
generated by the recent trend toward broadcast deregulation: the media company
mergers producing massive multi-outlet conglomerates; the intense economic
pressure on news programming; the daunting (and poorly covered) power of the
broadcast lobby in defeating legislation perceived to be against its interests; the
abandonment of foreign bureaus and ambitious reporting in favor of material that
is cheaper, or more sensationalistic, or “fluffier.” And when Shapiro concluded his
presentation, the first to speak up was Lawrence Grossman, with an assessment
reflecting some of these concerns. “I admire Neal’s rose-colored glasses and opti-
mistic view of what’s going on,” Grossman said. “I certainly do not share very
much of it.”
Among his very deep worries, Grossman said, are “the content gaps, that
are critical for this democracy—that we are not getting. We’re getting a lot of
headlines from all over the world, but when it comes to the major, very difficult
issues—the preemptive strike issues, the Social Security issues, the Medicare and
medical insurance
issues, the welfare and
work issues, education,
dealing with the envi-
ronment in questions
of global warming,
dealing with conti-
nents like Africa and
Latin America, where
we have no coverage
…No matter how
many news channels
we have, these things—
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the perspective, and the context, and the in-depth, the major and often boring
eye-glazing issues that are critical—are simply not being done in this day and age.”
“Find an interesting way to do it,” Shapiro shot back. “We are not going
to put on an hour of really boring anything. That doesn’t mean you don’t do it.
There are a lot of serious documentaries about welfare reform, which we did, or
Medicaid. Are there as many as there should be? Probably not. I would just say
it’s a challenge to our producers—if you work in commercial television, as
opposed to PBS, that is the structure. We have to make a living at it. And we’re
not going to do it by putting on uninteresting hours.”
Shapiro and Grossman were courteous, addressing each other from oppo-
site ends of the huge rectangle of tables, but in their brief exchange it was possi-
ble to discern deeply conflicting visions of television’s role in public life. From the
older man, whose tenure in television overlapped the era of the great first-genera-
tion broadcast journalists like Edward R. Murrow: You’ve abandoned the public
trust that came with the airwaves. From the younger man, whose profit-loss state-
ments ultimately show up on the books of the General Electric Company, since
1986 the owner of NBC: You want us to force-feed people eye-glazers because it will
be good for them. The discussion that ensued ranged widely over the territory of
the Hui/LaMay report, with particular attention to two areas of controversy:
Foreign reporting. Shapiro acknowledged that staffed international
bureaus are no longer the standard model for broadcast foreign coverage. But the
reasons for that are practical, he said; rapid air connections and modern phone
systems have made the far-flung bureau arrangement obsolete. “Part of the reason
we used to have so many foreign bureaus is because we just couldn’t get there in
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“I know in my heart that when you close foreign bureaus, you do
not provide the same quality of foreign coverage,” said Bob
Zelnick, chair of Boston University’s Department of Journalism.
“I know that when I worked in Israel . . . I was more qualified to
report on that issue, and that country, than somebody who para-
chuted in when things got hot and they needed a second jour-
nalist there.”
time,” he said. “If you weren’t there, you weren’t going to cover the story.”
Before this particular audience, that was not regarded as an explanation
with much resonance. Bob Zelnick, who recently took over Boston University’s
journalism department after a long ABC career that included postings in Tel Aviv
and Moscow, objected heatedly to the assertion that international news can be
covered responsibly without the expense of foreign bureaus. “I know in my heart
that when you close foreign bureaus, you do not provide the same quality of for-
eign coverage,” he said. “I know that when I worked in Israel, and spent nearly
every Saturday for two years driving around the West Bank and meeting with
Palestinians and taking my family to the refugee camps, I was more qualified to
report on that issue, and that country, than somebody who parachuted in when
things got hot and they needed a second journalist there.”
The actual appetite for foreign news, among American viewers and lis-
teners—how much they want, and in what form, and how much “the public
interest” suggests they should receive whether they want it or not—was the sub-
ject of some debate among the participants. National Public Radio (NPR) presi-
dent Kevin Klose, who during his newspaper years had worked as Moscow
bureau chief for The Washington Post, said his NPR listenership has repeatedly
expressed an intense interest in foreign news—both before and after September
11. “We find that our foreign news is among the top one or two subjects that our
listeners are most interested in,” Klose said. “We have 11 foreign bureaus. We
believe it’s very important to have people on the ground who speak the language,
who know the culture.” 
Bill Kovach, the veteran newspaper editor and reporter who now chairs
the Washington-based Committee of Concerned Journalists, said part of the chal-
lenge is providing viewers—and newspaper readers—with enough context and
background to make international news as understandable and vital as it ought to
be. “It was the coverage of the big story, and then [leaving viewers] to their own
devices to figure out what the hell it means, that lost the audience,” Kovach said.
“Every person that I know of, who cares about journalism, takes great solace once
a year when they judge competitions and say, ‘My God, look at the great journal-
ism that’s going on out there.’ But virtually all of it is special journalism. It’s not
day by day by day journalism—which is the only way, the only way, that journal-
ism is going to matter to self-governing people.”
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The sorry state of local broadcast news. Even Shapiro had little to offer
in defense of much of local news programming, which New York University
Journalism and Mass Communications department chair Jay Rosen described as “an
amazing story of decay and decline, and something close to public fraud.” Even as
overall value and profit margins have soared at local television stations, Rosen said,
the entire modern system of staffing and managing local television news stations
now works against good journalism—from the desperate nightly ratings competi-
tions, to local Emmy awards that exist largely as self-reassurance, to journalism
programs that “churn out a large number of people who will accept very low money
to do very poor quality work for the simple reason that they’re on television.”
Because so many of these programs are so widely held in contempt,
Rosen said, observers interested in improving broadcast’s service to the public
might want to start at the local level—perhaps by working up a widely publicized
awards program for the fifty worst TV news operations in the country. “One of
them might be Los Angeles,” he said. “Some of the most sophisticated markets
have the worst news, because of the dynamics of competition.” 
Here was an idea the forum participants seemed to like very much—par-
ticularly the journalism school deans, who have been exchanging worries about
whether they are filling their young graduates with serious aspirations that no
longer have much place in broadcast journalism. “A lot of us in the academic
community have been concerned about local news,” said USC’s Geoffrey Cowan.
“One of the areas where local news is so important, of course, is informing people
about the candidates—their own governments and the candidates who are run-
ning for office.”  
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The Annenberg Schools at USC and at the University of Pennsylvania
have partnered on studies of TV news reporting time devoted to local races,
Cowan said. In California, for example, “We had as a benchmark the race for
governor 30 years earlier, in which it was considered kind of scandalous that only
2½ percent of local news in California during that time dealt with the governor’s
race,” he said. When they repeated these measures twenty years later, he added,
“it turned out to be one half of one percent—one fifth of what it had been.”   
William Baker, president of New York’s nonprofit television station
WNET, also nodded approvingly at the idea of public awards for poor local news
programs. “I’ve been in a room where they’ve said, ‘None of these broadcasts are
very good,’” Baker said, recalling past judging assignments of his own, “‘but we
have to give an Emmy.’”  
Proposals for a Next Step
More than 50 years ago, in a series of meetings that took place over three years, a
13-man national commission financed by Time magazine founder Henry Luce set
out to examine the state of the American press. Led by the University of Chicago
president Robert Maynard Hutchins, the Hutchins Commission—which was com-
posed principally of scholars rather than working journalists—debated, interviewed
witnesses, studied staff-prepared reports and, in 1947, after many internal argu-
ments and revisions released a 133-page volume entitled A Free and Responsible Press.
The Hutchins report, as this document was more commonly called,
proved enormously controversial. It assailed American newspapers, both for bad
behavior (including sensationalism, entertainment-packaged-as-news, overly con-
centrated ownership, and other shortcomings that sound familiar a half-century
later) and for failing to provide the kind of intelligent public forum that the
Commission argued democracy demands of a free press. When the report was
released, as Annenberg Washington Program senior fellow Stephen Bates wrote in
his recent study of the Hutchins Commission, “The press proved unreceptive—in
fact, indignant—producing yelps of umbrage that nearly drowned out the
Commission’s recommendations. Over the half-century since, the report has
appreciably influenced academic thinking about journalism, but not journalism
itself…The experience of the Hutchins Commission makes for a revealing, some-
times poignant case study of a reformist flop.”1
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With that sobering history in mind,
UCB’s Orville Schell now convened the
final third of the Corporation’s day-long
meeting with a set of questions about what
might be done next—and by whom. Had
the time come to convene some modern-
day national commission, this time with
journalists at the core? “None of us will
probably ever agree on what’s wrong,” Schell
said. “But all of us in this room agree that
something isn’t right.”
The deans and other academic
leaders present at the forum—representing
journalism programs at the University of
Pennsylvania, Boston University, Columbia
University, USC, Northwestern University, Harvard University, the University of
Maryland, the University of Missouri, New York University, UCB and the
University of Texas at Austin—had gathered at a Manhattan restaurant the night
before to talk about how they might try to collectively intervene to improve tele-
vision news. Although the conversation at the next day’s meeting at the Carnegie
Corporation offices extended to crises far beyond those in broadcast, Schell and
his colleagues had zeroed in on television for two reasons.  
First, public ownership of the airwaves gives outsiders a legitimate plat-
form for intervening—for arguing that the “public interest” must be served by
companies that make money by using the people’s airwaves. 
Second, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) will, during
the coming year, likely be making a variety of decisions on concentration of
media ownership. These decisions may call for testimony, recommendations and
research—all of which could effectively be undertaken by a coalition of journal-
ists and academic leaders interested in more serious and ambitious news broad-
casts.  As USC’s Geoffrey Cowan declared at that dinner, not entirely in jest: “We
should form a conglomerate.”
But joint action is a challenging proposition to a group as vocal and tem-
peramentally independent as journalists, as the full forum’s afternoon discussion
made clear, and those familiar with the Hutchins Commission were also mindful
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of the rocky history of certain forms of broad-scale media critique. Over the
course of the afternoon, there were eloquent calls both for and against govern-
ment intervention, for and against the singling out of broadcast, for and against
the expansion of the discussion group. Perhaps the simplest question—whether
and under what circumstances this collection of news leaders might meet again—
drew a variety of suggestions.  “What would serve as the organizing principle?”
Schell asked. “How would we constitute ourselves?”
Although not spoken aloud, the challenge issued by Judy Woodruff at
the beginning of the day about whether September 11th had provided enduring
lessons for journalists was echoed in two key questions that seemed most likely to
lead to follow-up: 
• Should some iteration of this group continue convening, and should
others be invited in? The meeting underway at Carnegie Corporation involved a
large number of participants, and AP’s Louis Boccardi suggested that a smaller
working group of news leaders would have a better chance at, for example, affect-
ing decisions the FCC may make over the next year. “I’d despair trying to do that
with anything like the multiplicity that’s around this table,” Boccardi said. “But I
think that both in print and broadcast, there are serious people who think there is
something really wrong. I don’t think it would be hard for the Corporation to
enlist people in serious dialogue that could have a visible impact in the industry.”
What about politi-
cians, business leaders, or
academic heads outside jour-
nalism programs? “Some sort
of nonpartisan approach,
that brings a genuine public
interest to the table, is the
only way you can elevate a
discussion like this past the
scolding and the lamenting,”
said Columbia University’s
Michael Janeway, urging that
any future meetings include
legal and economic scholars
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as well as government officials: “People whose CVs look more like Gary Hart and
Warren Rudman,” Janeway said. “People at this table can’t really solve the problem.
You need others.”
Dean Mills, dean of the University of Missouri School of Journalism,
said he liked the idea of a formal commission of some sort—and that the
Hutchins Commission, despite having been hooted down at the time, produced a
work of lasting value for journalism ethics and training. Some of the
Commission’s central recommendations, such as those urging serious education
for journalists and greater accountability and self-examination by newspapers, no
longer sound remotely controversial, Mills said, adding, “I think that most of the
findings of the Hutchins Commission have become part of the culture. Most edi-
tors today would agree with me. I think the point is that over the long term—
even in the medium term—a commission of that kind, if it involves the public,
and it’s clear that it is in the public interest for the commission to be convened,
can in fact have a great impact.”
• If a group or commission does convene, what should be the focus of its
attention? NPR’s Kevin Klose was among those who warned against making tele-
vision journalism the sole focus of attention. “I think there is plenty of room for
a commission, or a public discussion and a public conversation,” he said. “But I
am extremely concerned about singling out one segment of who we are…We
heard from Neal Shapiro. He believes very strongly that he is doing better public
service—better news, better presentation—in more ways than was done 30 years
ago. And for all we know, he may be right. I think we have to be very respectful
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of who we are in the marketplace of ideas.”
Boston University’s Bob Zelnick, on the other hand, said he liked the
idea of setting up some study group with a manageable focus—and that broad-
cast seemed an appropriate one. “I don’t think any of us are in a position to cure
all the problems that have been articulated today,” he said. “What I liked about
Orville’s approach is that it sets up a body that can ask certain basic questions.
Are the networks providing sufficient coverage and sufficient news for the coun-
try at this time? That’s number one…The second question that I would like to
address is the role of public television. What is public television doing now? What
is an appropriate role for it in the future? How much of this gap, that we’ve artic-
ulated, can it fill?”
Kathleen Hall Jamieson, dean of the Annenberg School for Communication
at the University of Pennsylvania, observed that the day’s conversation had so far
presupposed a mutual understanding of what “quality journalism” is, “That
somehow if scholars got their act together, they would know how to track it,”
Jamieson said. But that may not be the case, she suggested. “Can we define it
broadly enough, and through some consensual base, so we’re not inadvertently
misleading people about what it is we’ve found?” she asked. “The same point can
be made about what’s available in ‘Dateline,’ and the magazine shows. When
would you count ‘Nightline’ in? When would you count it out?”
Even the terms “hard news” and “soft news” remain ill defined, Jamieson
said. The feature reporting of medical breakthroughs, for example, may be
regarded by viewers (or readers) as “extraordinarily relevant, important news—
and by what definition isn’t it?” she asked. “We should rethink some of the cate-
gories the academic community has come to think in, before we engage in this
larger dialog.”
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“Nothing has been changed in the nature of governments or
human nature that suggests government is going to be the solu-
tion to our problem here,” noted Tribune Publishing president
Jack Fuller. “If the academic world can deepen our understand-
ing of these forces...and help us know how to adapt to them in
a thoughtful manner that’s helpful to the public—that would a
be wonderful mission for academia.”
Ellen Wartella, dean of the
College of Communication at the
University of Texas at Austin, seconded
Jamieson’s call for preceding any public
conversation about the news business
with a more rigorous academic study of
what the news business is actually pro-
ducing—and what its audience thinks
about that. “I’d really like to see some
actual hard evidence for what we’re talk-
ing about,” Wartella said. “I don’t think
there’s agreement about what is hard or
soft news. I don’t think there’s agreement, from the perspective of the audience,
of what they’re looking for in news. And I don’t think that’s something we should
discount.” 
And despite Orville Schell’s suggestion that a working group might want
to appeal collectively to the FCC, or at least provide it with academically
researched argument in favor of more responsible journalistic programming, sev-
eral forum participants argued strenuously against approaching any arm of the
government for help. “Please, don’t go to the government to solve the problem of
public information in our society,” said Tribune Publishing president Jack Fuller.
“Nothing has been changed, in the nature of governments or human nature, that
suggests government is going to be the solution to our problem here. It’s more
likely to become our problem. If the academic world can deepen our understand-
ing of these forces, in a way none of us has time or the intellect to do, and help
us know how to adapt to them in a thoughtful manner that’s helpful to the pub-
lic—that would be a wonderful mission for academia.”
Larry Grossman, the former broadcast executive whose new Digital
Promise Project is working on policy recommendations for digital telecommuni-
cations technologies, urged the forum to follow very closely the public discussions
underway as the Senate begins hearings on the management of the telecommuni-
cations spectrum. “Last Monday, a bill was introduced into the Senate by
Senators Christopher Dodd (D-CT) and James Jeffords (I-VT), with bipartisan
support, to take a substantial amount of the revenues from the spectrum—as
Orville had suggested earlier—and put it into a trust fund, to be used for public
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interest and public
service purposes,”
Grossman said. “I
think the oppor-
tunity to do
something with
that kind of pub-
lic policy issue is
ripe. It is now
being considered.
There has been no
discussion about
public service,
public interest, in use of the new digital technologies. There’s a way of potentially
reaping billions of dollars from spectrum revenues. And if a group such as this
were to begin to study these kinds of things, I think there are avenues that could
be opened up that could be extraordinarily helpful.” 
By the close of the day’s proceedings, no plans for follow-up had been
agreed upon. But there appeared to be strong sentiment for continued conversa-
tion of some kind, especially one that might draw more participation from broad-
cast journalists and executives. “We have heard a lot,” said the Corporation’s pres-
ident, Vartan Gregorian, thanking the participants for their time.  “Now we’ll
digest, and see what we can do.” 
1 Stephen Bates, Realigning Journalism with Democracy: The Hutchins Commission, Its Times, and Ours, © 1995
The Annenberg Washington Program in Communications Policy Studies of Northwestern University, p. 1.
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introduction
In the literature on broadcast deregulation, most commentators have focused on the
statutory and traditional areas of public service obligation—local public affairs, children’s
programs, airtime access for political candidates, and public broadcasting. Relatively little
has been written about the effects deregulation has had on broadcast news, which the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) considers a category of programming sepa-
rate from public affairs. This paper offers an analysis of how the broad movement toward
deregulation—at the FCC, but even more vigorously in the federal courts and in
Congress—has affected local and national television news programming.
In some ways, deregulation has been wildly successful in promoting competi-
tion. Television news of some kind, for example, is now available 24 hours a day on one
or more cable channels, and local broadcast television stations offer viewers coverage of
the world that once only the national news networks could provide. At the same time,
deregulation has led to consolidation in the media industries, encouraging well-publicized
mergers that have created horizontally and vertically integrated companies that dominate
the production and distribution of media content. In the process, journalism has become
a small part of a larger media environment that includes entertainment, sports, music,
advertising and direct marketing. 
There are at least two notable results of these changes in broadcasting’s regulato-
ry and economic landscape. The first is that the most desirable “news” programming is
anything—Gary Condit’s affairs, Monica Lewinsky’s dress, or John F. Kennedy Jr.’s
death—that boosts ratings and so attracts higher advertising dollars and that can also be
leveraged across multiple media platforms. Stories such as these may lack for news value,
but they get a hugely disproportionate share of the market even as the incremental costs
of producing them decline. They are profit centers, and have to be; the real news is
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expensive to produce and, at least in the short term, offers few competitive benefits.
Moreover, the profitable areas of a media company that were once used to subsidize news
operations now face new competitive pressures from a whole range of new media, includ-
ing the Internet, with the result that news now has to justify itself in economic terms.
The second feature of the new competitive environment is that, so far as regula-
tors are concerned, the marketplace in which competition should be measured is not only
a local one, but extends to include large national corporations that own or control multi-
ple media outlets.  As a result, despite the fact that there are more news channels on tele-
vision than ever before, many people have few meaningful choices at the local level: they
can get only one newspaper and subscribe to only one cable company, one local telephone
provider. As broadcast television is deregulated further—as station ownership caps are lift-
ed and if the newspaper-television cross-ownership rule is lifted—many local markets will
see further concentration and even fewer competing sources of news.
These regulatory and economic changes are not limited to the United States,
though they have played out differently in other democracies over the past two decades.
In Western Europe, particularly, for example, there remains the widely held belief that the
state should guard the public interest in broadcasting against purely private interests.
Most European countries, for example, have elected to preserve their large public broad-
casting systems and, with respect to private broadcasting and cable television, adopted or
strengthened controls intended to promote and protect media pluralism. These policies
include specific commitments to news and political programming. In the United States,
the First Amendment bars the kind of public interest content regulation commonly found
in Europe, and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, though respected, is also finan-
cially weak, structurally inefficient, and struggling to define its own public service mission
in the multi-channel marketplace.
So what to do? The essay that follows discusses how American broadcasting got
to this crossroads, what it has meant for news programming, and explores some of the
proposals for reform.
The Establishment of the Public Interest Standard in Broadcasting
Most people might be surprised to learn that they, the public, own the airwaves. But
Congress authorized the licensing of commercial broadcasters to use this scarce national
resource in exchange for serving “the public interest, convenience and necessity.” These
six words have generated more debate and analysis than perhaps any other phrase in com-
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munications policy. The following section traces the origins of the public interest standard
in broadcast regulation.
A. Radio Act of 1912
The Radio Act of 1912 established several principles that are still a part of broadcast regu-
lation. First, no one would broadcast without a government-issued license. Second,
licensees would be assigned frequencies on the electromagnetic spectrum. The Act
empowered the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to carry out this duty. However, it
gave him no authority to reject license applications. Congress did not anticipate the need
for this since radio was still in its infancy and there were plenty of frequencies for anyone
who wanted to operate a radio station. 
This system worked satisfactorily until the early 1920s, when the rapid growth
of radio stations created intolerable signal interference. Some stations took matters into
their own hands by “jumping” their assigned frequencies in violation of their licenses,
worsening the interference. It became clear that the number and the operation of radio
stations had to be controlled. But under the Radio Act of 1912, the Secretary had no
choice but to grant licenses to every applicant. Moreover, the courts interpreted the Act
very narrowly and said the Secretary did not have the authority to create additional rules.
So the number of radio stations and the interference continued to grow. 
With chaos looming, then-Secretary of Commerce Herbert Hoover recognized
the crying need for regulation and convened a series of national radio conferences attend-
ed by representatives of the radio industry and government. Some scholars say it was at
this first conference that the concept of public interest in broadcasting was first articulat-
ed. Hoover called broadcasting “a great national asset” and said it was “of primary public
interest to say who is to do the broadcasting, under what circumstances and with what
type of material.”i At the end of the conference, the delegates declared: “It is the sense of
the Conference that Radio Communication is a public utility and as such should be regu-
lated and controlled by the Federal Government in the public interest.”ii
Despite the conference’s repeated calls for government intervention, Congress
was unwilling to act. By 1926, overlapping frequencies made radio listening such a dis-
turbing experience that manufacturers reported a decline in sales of receiver sets. 
B. Radio Act of 1927
Finally, in 1927, Congress passed the Radio Act of 1927. This Act embodied the recom-
mendations of the radio conference, and thus, according to communications historian
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Sydney Head, was “to a large extent the product of the radio industry itself.”iii The new
law declared that the airwaves are owned by the public and controlled by government,
and no one could use them for private purposes unless it served the “public interest, con-
venience, or necessity”—a standard already used in public utility law. But where telegraph
and telephone services, for example, were treated as public utilities and subject to rate and
service regulation, broadcasting had no such burdens. Broadcast stations are not and have
never been public utilities in fact or in law. They thus operate within the profoundly
favorable tradition of public interest interpretation associated with utility monopolies, but
are also exempt from the service requirements of such monopolies. In short, the 1927
Radio Act—not for the last time—would give broadcasters the quid without the quo.
The Act established a new regulatory agency, the Federal Radio Commission
(FRC), to license broadcast stations. In contrast to the 1912 law’s narrow limits on the
power of its administrators, the 1927 law gave the FRC broad powers to use its discretion
in awarding licenses, using the public interest as its standard. A specific definition of what
constituted the public interest was not given, so it was left up to the FRC to decide what
it meant. 
C. Communications Act of 1934
The Communications Act of 1934 expanded upon the Radio Act of 1927 to include the
telephone and telegraph industries. The Communications Act was essentially a reproduc-
tion of the 1927 Act, except that the Federal Radio Commission was replaced with the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC).  Again, Congress left it up to the FCC to
make the rules and regulations it needed to license broadcast stations—subject always to
the “public interest, convenience and necessity.” 
In the years preceding the passage of the 1934 Act, several members of Congress
and several organized groups of educators lobbied hard to reform broadcasting, which in
the seven short years since 1927 had seen the precipitous decline of nonprofit and educa-
tional radio and the corresponding growth of commercial networks. The reform move-
ment failed, in part because the reformers themselves could not agree on what they want-
ed, but the end result was significant. Unlike virtually every other major democracy, most
of which created publicly funded, noncommercial and nonprofit monopolies on the
model of the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the United States allowed broad-
casting to develop as a private, profit-seeking commercial enterprise. Ironically, in the
years immediately following World War II—well before television became a mass medi-
um—Americans in charge of occupied Japan and Germany were instrumental in creating
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the public broadcasting systems of each country, widely regarded today as among the best
in the world. Public broadcasting in the United States would not be formally created until
1967, but the Corporation for Public Broadcasting has always struggled to develop rev-
enues, audiences and a clear sense of mission.
D. Scarcity and the Public Trustee Model
The obligation to serve the public interest is at the heart of the public trustee model of
broadcasting. This model is based on the notion that the airwaves are “scarce” because
there are far more people who want to use the airwaves than can be accommodated.
Congress could have required that each frequency be shared on a daily, weekly or other
basis. Instead, it developed a system in which short-term broadcast licenses are awarded to
those who volunteer to serve the public interest as fiduciaries for all those who are kept
off the air. The Federal Radio Commission described the public trustee model in this way:
“[Despite the fact that] the conscience and judgment of a station’s manage-
ment are necessarily personal… the station itself must be operated as if
owned by the public… It is as if people of a community should own a sta-
tion and turn it over to the best man in sight with this injunction: ‘Manage
this station in our interest.’”iv
Thus, a licensee must balance what it might do as a private business with what it
is required to do as a public trustee.
Some critics argue that the concept of scarcity, which is the basis of the public
trustee model, has been invalidated over the past few decades by the proliferation of other
media outlets, such as cable and satellite television and the Internet. But defenders of the
scarcity argument say scarcity in broadcasting is not defined by the number of media
voices, but by the number of people who wish to broadcast compared with the number of
frequencies available. They say that this same scarcity exists today, and point to the cost of
broadcast stations, which typically sell for a multiple of 20 or more times the actual value
of the station. The difference lies in the value of the licenses.
E. First Amendment Issues
The Communications Act defines broadcasting as a form of speech covered by the First
Amendment and explicitly forbids the FCC from censoring broadcast programs or inter-
fering with freedom of speech on the air. Yet the courts have ruled that because the airwaves
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are scarce and because broadcasters enjoy special privileges, they do not have the same First
Amendment protections as the print media. In other words, the content of broadcast pro-
grams can be regulated to an extent that would be an unconstitutional violation of the
First Amendment in the print media. In the landmark case, Red Lion Broadcasting vs. the
FCC (1969), the Supreme Court declared: “There is no sanctuary in the First Amendment
for unlimited private censorship in a medium not open to all… It is the right of the view-
ers and listeners, not the right of broadcasters, which is paramount.”v
F. Comparative Analysis
The electromagnetic spectrum is public property in all democratic countries, not just the
United States, and broadcasting is thus everywhere regulated in ways that print is not.
While regulatory schemes differ widely, the justifications for them are generally the same.
The first, discussed above, is spectrum scarcity, the idea that there are more people who
wish to operate a channel than there are available channels, and that without some sort of
“traffic cop” the spectrum would be so overwhelmed with conflicting signals that no one
would be heard at all. 
The second is that broadcasting has many of the features of an economic public
good; the cost of sending a television signal to one person or one million people is the
same, the incremental costs of serving additional viewers is zero, and it is impossible and
inefficient to limit access. This makes it impossible for the broadcaster to recover his
operating costs, and thus broadcasting is funded in one of two ways, through public sub-
sidy or commercial advertising, or, increasingly, some mix of the two. As digital television
develops, broadcasters may also be able to tap subscription fees as a source of revenue.
A third basis for broadcast regulation is broadcasting’s availability to the very
young. Print content unsuitable for minors may be concealed from them in various ways,
but the broadcast signal is accessible to anyone at the flip of a switch. Though countries
differ in their judgment about the kinds of programming unsuitable for children, most
seek to control access to that content in some way, usually through time or labeling regu-
lations. Importantly, most also seek to provide children with high-quality, noncommercial
programming made just for them. 
Finally, most countries view broadcasting as a uniquely important medium that
supports democratic processes because it delivers news, public affairs, education, arts and
culture to the farthest corners of the country, including to those who are illiterate or simply
beyond the reach of major print media. In the so-called “Third Wave” of global democra-
tization, television and radio have been a major focus of development efforts by inter-gov-
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ernmental organizations like the United Nations, NATO and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as countless non-governmental organizations
concerned with the role of broadcasting in building and sustaining stable democracies.
In short, one can go almost anywhere in the world and, by watching television, get a
sense of what a country’s values are. South Africa provides a notable example. There, the
South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC), once a central instrument of the
apartheid regime, has been reformed as a public broadcaster on the European model. Its
audience includes an enormous number of people who cannot read and whose experience
of freedom, let alone democracy, is limited. To ensure that all of them can participate in
the country’s democratic transition and development, the SABC is required to broadcast
programs in all 10 official languages of the country, from Afrikaans to Zulu. That com-
mitment is expensive, maybe even quixotic, but to the South Africans it is also a matter
of national identity and aspiration.
Public Interest Regulations
A. Licensing Scheme
The FCC’s authority over broadcasting revolves around its licensing power. The
Communications Act limited the term of broadcast licenses to three years, at which time
stations were required to apply for renewal. (Today, under the Telecommunications Act of
1996, the term of a license is eight years.) The renewal process allows the FCC periodic
opportunities to consider whether the licensee has in fact been operating in the public
interest. In theory, the renewal process gives the agency enormous power to influence sta-
tions’ behavior and programming because stations operate under the implicit threat that
their license might not be renewed—a scheme often referred to as “regulation by raised
eyebrow.” But in practice, the Commission has typically renewed most licenses even
though some stations did not live up to the promises they made in their license applica-
tions.
Still, license renewal used to be an elaborate process. Broadcasters were required
to submit detailed programming logs to the FCC as part of their application. If outside
parties felt they could do a better job of serving the public interest, they could challenge
the licenses of incumbent broadcasters in a quasi-judicial process called a “comparative
hearing.” These hearings often lasted years. In the 1960s and 1970s, it was not unusual
for citizen groups to challenge the license renewal of a radio or television station. Such
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challenges were rarely successful, but provided a tool for ordinary citizens to pressure
broadcasters to meet their statutory obligations.
B. FCC Policies
Interpretation of the public interest standard has been a continuing source of controversy
because Congress never provided a clear definition of what constituted the “public inter-
est, convenience and necessity.” Instead, it gave the FCC broad and flexible authority to
define the public interest as technology and public needs change. Critics have said that
regulation in the “public interest” has come to mean whatever regulators want it to mean
at a given time, allowing them to exert unusual influence over broadcasters. But others,
all across the political and ideological spectrum, complain that the standard’s vagueness
has made it inherently weak and constitutionally suspect. Despite this ambiguity, the
FCC established a myriad of policies to ensure that broadcasters served the public inter-
est. The following section discusses a few of the policies that were designed to promote
diversity, civic discourse, localism and competition.
Programming Guidelines
From time to time, the FCC issued general guidelines to encourage programming that
served the tastes and needs of a wide audience. The most famous is the 1946 policy state-
ment, known as the “Blue Book” because of its blue cover. It defined how public interest
performance would be evaluated at license renewal time, requiring four elements: live
local programs, public affairs programming, sustaining (unsponsored) shows, and limits
on excessive advertising. The Blue Book was symbolically important, but it never had any
legal force. In fact, the FCC abandoned it in the face of fierce opposition from the
National Association of Broadcasters and from Congress.
Another set of programming guidelines was contained in the “1960 Program
Policy Statement.” It listed 14 major elements “usually necessary” to meet the public
interest, including: opportunity for local self-expression; development and use of local tal-
ent, programs for children; religious programs; educational programs; public affairs; polit-
ical broadcasts; agricultural programs; news programs; sports programs; and entertain-
ment programs. Like the Blue Book, these guidelines were never strictly enforced.
Fairness Doctrine
Established in 1949, the Fairness Doctrine decreed that radio and television stations have
a responsibility to air issues of public importance and in doing so, must provide reason-
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able opportunity for the presentation of contrasting viewpoints. The FCC concluded that
“the public interest is best served in a democracy through the ability of the people to hear
expositions of the various positions taken by responsible groups and individuals on partic-
ular topics and to choose between them.”vi While the doctrine was intended to promote
civic discourse, many broadcasters complained that it had the opposite effect. Some sta-
tions avoided covering controversial issues for fear that they would violate the policy.
Ascertainment
In 1971, the FCC began formally requiring stations to “ascertain” the programming
needs of the local audience. This involved conducting random surveys of the community
and interviewing community leaders from 19 specified categories. From this, stations
would determine what programming to offer that dealt with the problems ascertained.
Broadcasters complained that ascertainment was overly burdensome and cost them
between $2,500 and $9,000 per year. 
Ownership Limits
The FCC established several rules to maximize the number of media owners, nationally
and locally. The goal was to ensure diversity, competition and a multiplicity of voices. For
decades, these ownership rules were strictly enforced and rarely waived. As a result, media
ownership remained diffuse. 
The first national ownership limit on broadcast stations was adopted in the early
1940s. It prohibited a single entity from owning more than three television stations
nationwide. Several years later, this limit was raised to five. The cap was modified again in
1954 to no more than seven AM, seven FM and seven TV stations nationwide and
remained essentially unchanged until the 1980s. 
On the local level, as early as the 1930s, the FCC adopted a policy of not grant-
ing licenses that would result in a “duopoly.” A duopoly is the common ownership of
more than one station in the same market. Originally, the local rule allowed common
ownership of more than one station in the same area if each station was in a different
service. But in 1970, the FCC modified the rule, prohibiting a single entity from owning
a radio station and a television station in the same market (though it grandfathered exist-
ing combinations.) Another local restriction enacted in 1975 was the cross-ownership
rule, which restricts ownership of a daily newspaper and an AM, FM or TV station in the
same community. This is also known as the one-to-a-market rule.
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Broadcast Deregulation: 1980s to present
A. Reagan Revolution
During the Reagan years, U.S. communications policy underwent a seismic shift. A
deregulation-minded FCC dismantled long-standing rules, challenging the means by
which compliance with the public interest standard was determined. Mark Fowler, who
was chairman from 1981 until 1987, believed that the free market, and not the govern-
ment, should decide what Americans see and hear, a view he once summarized by observ-
ing that, “television is just a toaster with pictures.” Under Fowler’s marketplace model, a
station’s commercial success would indicate that the public interest was being served. It
was also argued that the rise of cable television undermined the scarcity argument, the
basis of the public trustee model, because of the potential for unlimited channel capacity.
Advocates of deregulation said the new media marketplace could provide a multiplicity of
voices, eliminating the need for broadcast regulation. 
Among the deregulatory policies implemented during the 1980s:
• The “anti-trafficking” rule was relaxed in 1982, so a station owner only had to wait
one year, instead of three, before selling a license. The FCC determined that
encouraging the transfer of a station actually served the public interest because
owners might improve programming in order to increase the financial value of their
station and sell it at a higher price.
• The license renewal process was shortened in 1984 and made virtually automatic
through so-called “postcard renewal.” Stations no longer had to submit program-
ming logs; lengthy renewal applications were replaced by postcard-sized forms. 
• Guidelines requiring stations to offer a specified amount of non-entertainment
programming were also eliminated in 1984. The FCC determined that stations
were increasing the amounts of news and public affairs programming on their own.
• Ascertainment requirements were also eliminated that year. The FCC determined
that the cost of these community surveys outweighed the benefits and that market
forces would ensure that stations were responsive to their communities. It estimated
that doing away with ascertainment would save 66,956 work hours for the industry
and 761.5 work hours for the FCC each year.
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• The limit on the number of television stations a single company could own was
raised from seven to twelve in 1984. To prevent the acquisition by one entity of
large numbers of stations in the smaller markets, the FCC established an audience
reach cap, prohibiting any company from owning stations that collectively reach
more than 25 percent of the national TV audience.
• The Fairness Doctrine was abolished in 1987. The FCC decided it no longer
served the public interest and had the effect of inhibiting speech instead of promot-
ing it. Congress has tried several times to write the doctrine into law. Before the
FCC repealed it, Congress approved such legislation, but it was vetoed by President
Reagan. Since then, the House has passed it three times, but President George Bush
Sr. threatened to veto it and the legislation never reached a vote in the Senate.
B. Telecommunications Act of 1996
The deregulation fervor continued into the nineties, culminating in the sweeping
Telecommunications Act of 1996. The primary objective of the new law was to open
markets to competition and allow local phone companies, long-distance carriers and cable
operators to enter each other’s businesses. Presumably, consumers would benefit from bet-
ter service, and lower phone and cable rates. The Act also contained the following provi-
sions that deregulated the broadcasting industry:
• License terms were extended from five to eight years, giving the public less oppor-
tunity to challenge license renewals.
• New license renewal procedures were instituted, making it more difficult for chal-
lengers to compete for an existing broadcast license. A licensee has to be found
unqualified for renewal before a challenger’s application can even be submitted. 
• All limitations on the number of radio stations companies can own nationally were
eliminated. Local radio ownership rules were eased, allowing companies to own up
to eight stations in large markets.
• The cap on the number of television stations any one company can own nationally
was raised from 25 percent to 35 percent of the nation’s television households.
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• The FCC was required to review its broadcast regulations every two years with an
eye toward scrapping any that are outdated.
2002 and Beyond
The FCC is poised to launch a new round of deregulation under Bush-appointed chair-
man Michael Powell, son of Secretary of State Colin Powell. Chairman Powell has made
clear his free-market philosophy, once calling regulation “the oppressor.” When asked for
his definition of the “public interest,” he joked, “I have no idea… It’s an empty vessel in
which people pour in whatever their preconceived views or biases are.”vii Powell’s critics
say he has a one-dimensional view of the market. At a Congressional hearing last year, he
told lawmakers his plans to “validate or eliminate” the FCC’s limits on media ownership.
That comment so irked Senator Ernest Hollings (D-SC), chairman of the Senate
Commerce Committee, that he called a hearing “to set the record straight.” Hollings
pointed out that according to the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the burden of proof
was on those who want to loosen ownership rules, not the other way around. viii
Powell has been emboldened by several recent court rulings, which have ques-
tioned the validity of the media ownership limits. Among the rules under scrutiny in the
courts and at the Commission, which are likely to be lifted:
• TV/newspaper cross-ownership. This 1975 FCC rule prevents a single company
from owning a newspaper and a television station in the same market. There are
about 40 grandfathered newspaper/broadcast combinations in existence today, and
the FCC has granted a number of permanent waivers to the restriction. The FCC is
under pressure to eliminate it as a result of several recent deals. Rupert Murdoch’s
News Corp., which already owns the New York Post and New York City’s Fox televi-
sion station under a special waiver, picked up another local station when it acquired
station operator Chris-Craft Industries. The Tribune Company’s purchase of The
Times Mirror Company gave it both a newspaper and TV station in New York, Los
Angeles, and Hartford, Connecticut. Gannett’s purchase of Central Newspapers
gave it a newspaper and TV station in Phoenix. 
• TV ownership cap. This FCC rule limits a single company from owning television
stations that collectively reach more than 35 percent of the nation’s TV audience.
Earlier this year, a federal appeals court ruled that the cap was constitutional, but
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that the FCC needs to better justify its existence or eliminate it. Meantime, News
Corp. and Viacom are allowed to continue to be in violation of the cap; both own
stations that reach 41 percent of U.S. households. They and the other networks
want to get rid of the cap so they can continue to expand. But smaller broadcasters
say easing the cap would give networks too much power and endanger the diversity
of local voices. The issue has so divided broadcasters that Fox, CBS and NBC have
resigned from the National Association of Broadcasters because the group refuses to
fight for lifting the ownership cap. 
• TV duopoly. This rule prohibits a company from owning two television stations in
the same market. For decades, double-station ownership or “duopoly” was banned
outright. But the FCC last year amended the rule to allow a company to own two
TV stations in the same market as long as one of them is not among the top four
and if at least eight competitors remained after the deal. Sinclair Broadcasting Inc.
sued over the definition of “competitors,” saying cable, direct broadcast satellite,
radio or newspapers should be counted among the eight. The appeals court agreed
that the rule was “arbitrary and capricious” and sent it back to the FCC for review.
Critics say duopolies stifle competition and threaten the diversity of ideas. But
many broadcasters say dual ownership makes them stronger financially and better
able to serve the community.
• Cable ownership caps. This rule, which prevents a cable operator from serving
more than 30 percent of all U.S. subscribers, was overturned by a federal court last
year. The FCC is considering a new standard, which some analysts say could exceed
50 percent.
Deregulation has also changed the licensing process. Today, new broadcast
licenses are no longer granted to those who best serve the public, rather they go to the
highest bidder. In the 1997 Balanced Budget Act, Congress authorized the FCC to auc-
tion television and radio licenses in cases where there is more than one applicant. The
Commission determined that auctions are more effective at assigning licenses than com-
parative hearings, which had become long, costly affairs. The auctions are conducted elec-
tronically and applicants can place bids over the Internet. Very little is required of the
winning bidder besides a one-time $230 license fee and proof that the licensee is techni-
cally, legally and financially qualified to operate a television station. “We used to look at a
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licensee’s programming plans, but we don’t consider that anymore because of deregula-
tion,” says FCC attorney adviser Shaun Maher. “Licensees can operate the way they want
to.”ix
Similarly, license renewal has become largely an automatic procedure. Deregulation
removed most of the standards by which a station’s public interest performance was evalu-
ated, making renewal a near certainty. Today, the only remaining programming require-
ment is for broadcasters to air three hours a week of educational children’s programming
under the 1990 Children’s Television Act. While passage of the act has spurred some addi-
tional educational shows, overall response has fallen considerably short of expectations. A
University of Pennsylvania study in 1999 by the Annenberg Public Policy Center found
that a fifth of all programs billed as educational for children had “little or educational
value.” FCC officials say enforcing the rule is difficult because there is no clear definition
of what constitutes an educational show. So while license renewal is meant to check the
public interest performance of broadcasters, the privilege once granted is rarely with-
drawn. In effect, the airwaves have become a property of the broadcasters, not the public. 
Impact of Deregulation 
A. Media Consolidation
Deregulation of media ownership has triggered an unprecedented wave of buyouts and
consolidations in the industry. Across the country, smaller companies have been swal-
lowed up by larger ones with breathtaking speed in the growing belief that bigger is bet-
ter. Fueling the merger activity is the desire to achieve vertical integration or “synergy,” in
which companies own content as well as the means to market and distribute it. 
The first wave of mergers came in the mid-eighties when all three major broad-
cast networks were acquired by larger companies. Capital Cities, led by billionaire
investor Warren Buffet, bought ABC. Loews Corporation, led by Laurence Tisch,
acquired CBS. And General Electric, led by Jack Welch, took over RCA, who owned
NBC. In addition, Rupert Murdoch and its News Corporation purchased six Metromedia
television stations, which formed the base of his Fox network. The second wave of mergers
came in the mid-nineties, when Disney bought Capital Cities/ABC, Westinghouse
acquired CBS, and Time Warner took over Turner Communications, along with its cable
news network, CNN. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 set off another stampede that
cut the number of owners dramatically: from 5,100 commercial radio owners to 3,800
today and 543 commercial TV owners to 360.x The mammoth deals included Viacom’s
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purchase of CBS (Westinghouse, which had acquired CBS in 1995, took the CBS name
in 1997) and America Online’s merger with Time Warner. 
Almost 20 years ago, in his book Media Monopoly (Beacon Press, 1983), Ben
Bagdikian, journalist and former dean of U.C. Berkeley’s Graduate School of Journalism,
expressed alarm that the entire news and entertainment industry was dominated by only
50 companies.xi Today, five conglomerates dominate mass media in the United States,
with another dozen or so companies rounding out the select group:
• Walt Disney owns ABC, 10 owned-and-operated TV stations, and 50 radio sta-
tions. Other holdings include six magazines, five book publishers, six production
companies, six movie studios, Disney theme parks, a cruise line, and a host of cable
networks including the Disney Channel, ESPN, Fox Family Channel and SoapNet.
• Viacom owns CBS, 39 owned-and-operated TV stations, including two each in
Philadelphia, Boston, Dallas and Detroit, and 184 Infinity radio stations. Other
holdings are King World, Blockbuster Entertainment, four magazines, five book
publishers, the Paramount movie studio and theme parks, and a slew of cable net-
works, including UPN, MTV, VH1, Showtime, Nickelodeon, BET, The Movie
Channel and TNN.
• General Electric owns NBC and 13 owned-and-operated TV stations. Other media
holdings include CNBC, MSNBC (owned with Microsoft), AMC and Bravo
(owned with Cablevision and MGM) and Telemundo. In addition, it owns a num-
ber of insurance firms, financial services, and manufacturers of a range of products
from light bulbs to appliances to aircraft engines.
• News Corporation owns Fox and its 26 owned-and-operated TV stations, includ-
ing two each in New York, Los Angeles and Dallas. Other media holdings include
Fox News Channel, National Geographic Channel (owned with National
Geographic Society), the New York Post, The Weekly Standard, TV Guide,
HarperCollins Publishers, various movie studios and production companies, and a
number of sports teams including the New York Knicks and the New York Rangers.
• AOL Time Warner owns CNN and America Online. Other holdings include
HBO, TBS, TNT, the Cartoon Network, four book publishers, three movie stu-
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dios, three sports teams, more than 40 music labels and more than 64 magazines,
including Time, Life and People.
Aside from the mega-mergers, there have been many joint ventures between the
media giants themselves, creating a vast web of interconnecting interests. For example,
Disney/ABC and News Corp./Fox are partners through their joint ownership of Movies.com.
Disney/ABC is also partners with General Electric/NBC and Hearst Corp. through their
joint ownership of the Arts and Entertainment Network and the History and Biography
cable channels. GE/NBC is allied with AOL Time Warner/CNN, News Corp./Fox,
Viacom/CBS, and Liberty Media through their common ownership of TiVo, the digital
video recording service. Recently, AOL Time Warner/CNN has been talking separately
with Viacom/CBS and Disney/ABC about forming a cooperative venture to reduce news-
gathering overhead. “[These companies] are partners one day and business adversaries the
next,” said Tom Wolzien, a senior media analyst with Sanford C. Bernstein & Co.xii
The media conglomerates are also linked to dozens of non-media corporations
through memberships on their boards of directors. Among the outside interests represented
by directors at Disney/ABC last year, for example, were Boeing, FedEx, Northwest Airlines,
Sun Microsystems and Xerox. General Electric/NBC’s board had directors representing
Anheuser-Busch, Chase Manhattan, Coca-Cola, Honeywell and the New York Stock Exchange.
Viacom/CBS’s board included directors representing Amazon.com, American Express,
Daimler Chrysler and Pfizer. Some of the media firms even share the same directors.
These diverse and interlocking interests pose a major ethical challenge for jour-
nalists inside the merged entities. Potential conflicts of interest abound when reporters try
to cover their parent companies and their siblings. At the very least, it fuels second-guess-
ing about news decisions and undermines journalists’ credibility. A survey by the Pew
Research Center and the Columbia Journalism Review found that more than a third of
broadcast journalists admit they have softened the tone of stories to benefit the interests of
their news organizations.xiii
B. Profits Over Public Service
Traditionally, as pioneered by Edward R. Murrow and others, television news was regard-
ed as a public service. News operations were tolerated as “loss leaders” or “cost centers”
because they brought prestige and credibility to a network. They were not expected to turn
a profit. But today, news divisions are small parts of giant publicly held conglomerates
whose primary imperative is shareholder value, and news has been recast as a “profit center.”
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The conglomerates that own the networks do not break down financial results
on their news divisions. But according to estimates by Broadcasting & Cable magazine,
NBC News is now said to contribute about $300 million in operating profit to General
Electric, while its cousins CNBC and MSNBC contribute another $300 million in profit.
CBS News is estimated to contribute about $150 million to Viacom, while ABC News
contributes about $130 million to Disney.xiv It is not unusual for television stations to
generate a 40-to-50 percent return. 
Pressure to maintain high profit margins has forced news operations to be more
creative about finding new sources of revenue. This often means blurring the lines
between advertising and news content. A study last year by the Project for Excellence in
Journalism found that in more than two-thirds of television stations, news sponsors are
named by the announcer or identified with a particular news segment. Some stations even
give sponsors interviews or mention in the body of a newscast in exchange for their sup-
port.xv “Instead of creating programs that serve the public interest, some stations are cre-
ating entire programs that advertisers would be interested in sponsoring,” said Deborah
Potter, a former CBS News correspondent who now runs NewsLab, a nonprofit research
and training center that works with local television newsrooms.xvi
Some stations are feeling so squeezed by profit pressures that they are getting out
of the news business altogether. Sinclair Broadcast Group recently discontinued local
news broadcasts at its ABC affiliates in Winston-Salem, North Carolina and in St. Louis,
Missouri, because of sagging advertising revenues. Similarly, in January, Holston Valley
Broadcasting Group decided to stop producing local newscasts at its ABC- and UPN-
affiliated stations in Kingsport, Tennessee. Other small-market stations have followed suit,
including the ABC affiliates in Marquette, Michigan and Topeka, Kansas. Hank Price, a
senior fellow at Northwestern University’s Media Management Center and former general
manager at WBBM-TV, predicts local newscasts will continue to dwindle. “In the end,
most communities will end up with one or two ‘mega’ news stations while other outlets
will offer entertainment or specialized programming,” said Price.xvii
Softening of News
In the effort to cut costs and attract audience, television has shifted away from hard news
toward more entertainment-driven “soft” news. These are stories that have no clear con-
nection to public affairs or policy issues and that are selected for their capacity to entertain
rather than inform. The softening of news is especially pronounced in the morning news
programs and prime-time news magazines, but has also become a major factor on the net-
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work’s signature evening newscasts. NBC revamped its “Nightly News with Tom Brokaw”
in 1997 by trimming hard news and adding more lifestyle and soft features. It has been
the dominant and most profitable newscast ever since. 
“Soft news” has also become an important staple of local television newscasts.
The Denver-based nonprofit group, Rocky Mountain Media Watch, analyzed the news-
casts of 102 local TV stations in 52 metropolitan areas and compared the cumulative air-
time given to soft and “silly” stories and items about celebrities to the amount of hard
news, producing a so-called “Fluff Index.”  The average Fluff Index of the survey was
25.1, meaning that there was one-fourth as much fluff as news. Some of the memorable
soft news documented in the survey included two new fads—hair tattoos and beer
baths—and there were also stories about a lost dog returning home and a horse being res-
cued from the mud in California; 27 stations carried this last item.xviii
While soft news may grab people’s attention initially, it may be hastening the
overall decline in news audience. A recent survey by political scientist Thomas Patterson
found that two-and-a-half times as many people said they prefer hard news to soft news,
and those who prefer hard news are much heavier consumers of news. But the survey
found that hard news consumers are not happy with the product they are getting, and as
a result, are paying less attention to news than in the past. Patterson said this suggests that
soft news may actually be diminishing the overall level of interest in news.
“Sensationalism draws people’s attention in the first instance, but endless sensationalism
may ultimately dull it,” he said. xix
Yet hard news strategies are not always successful. Two years ago Chicago’s
WBBM-TV experimented with a no-frills 10 o’clock newscast anchored by respected
journalist Carol Marin. The goal was to offer viewers hard-hitting reports without sensa-
tionalism or fluff. While it was widely praised, the program was poorly rated. Among view-
ers between the ages of 25 and 54—a group coveted by advertisers—the show dropped
from a 3.8 rating to a 1.8. WBBM pulled the plug on the experiment after eight months.
“The response from viewers told us that the style was one that they could not become
accustomed to,” said Walt DeHaven, the station’s vice president and general manager. xx
Body Bag Journalism
Another trend has been the dramatic increase in the coverage of violent crime, disasters
and personal tragedies. A survey by the Center for Media and Public Affairs showed that
while homicides declined by 13 percent in America from 1990 to 1995, the number of
crime stories on the three network evening news shows rose by 336 percent—a figure that
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excludes all stories about the O.J. Simpson case. The “If it bleeds, it leads” philosophy is
especially prevalent on local TV news. A recent survey conducted by the Project on Media
Ownership found that an average of 47 percent of the news on Baltimore’s local TV
newscasts was devoted to crime and disaster stories.xxi Similarly, a 1997 survey conducted
by the Detroit News found that an average of 43 percent of the news on Detroit’s late-
evening newscasts focused on crime and disaster.xxii
The constant focus on crime not only takes time away from other important
stories, but it influences people’s perception about crime and public safety, fueling fear,
cynicism and distrust. A study by the nonprofit group, Public Agenda, found that people
who watch TV news every day are far more likely to think that crime and drugs are the
biggest problems in their community.xxiii “When you bombard people with frightening
pictures, it creates a sense that things are out of control—a contagion of violence in the
mind of people that is at odds with the reality of the world, which is that violent crime
has been dropping in America,” said Robert Lifton, professor of psychology at the John
Jay College of Criminal Justice in New York. “People should feel safer. But you really
wouldn’t know it from the news.”xxiv
Shrinking Foreign Coverage 
The pressure to maximize profits and minimize cost has resulted in a significant decline
of international news coverage. Ironically, this comes at a time when globalization has
made nations more interdependent. The amount of time network television devotes to
foreign stories has fallen from 45 percent in 1975 to less than 14 percent in 1995, accord-
ing to a study by the Shorenstein Center for the Press, Politics and Public Policy.xxv
According to the Tyndall Report, which tracks television news content, foreign bureaus
provided only a third as many minutes of coverage from the evening newscasts on ABC,
CBS and NBC in 2000 (1,382) than they did in 1989 (4,032).xxvi CBS News anchor
Dan Rather says if he tried to cover more foreign news in his evening newscast, his bosses
might tell him that NBC’s “Nightly News” does the least and gets the highest
ratings.xxvii
Since the end of the Cold War, the networks have closed and consolidated many
of their overseas bureaus. Fifteen years ago, ABC News had 17 foreign bureaus; now it
has seven. CBS News has scaled back to 11. NBC News says it has staff in 15 foreign
cities, but has significantly reduced its overseas corps. Some news executives say they no
longer need to maintain a large foreign staff because modern transportation and commu-
nications allow them to move staff quickly when news breaks. But critics say this means
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international stories don’t get covered unless they involve a major crisis. 
With fewer foreign correspondents to report the news, there’s been an increased
reliance on “voice-over” reporting. That means reporters are filing stories from faraway
bureaus having never actually been at the scene. Instead, they rely on footage provided by
stringers and overseas video wire services, like Reuters and Associated Press Television.
Viewers often have no idea the correspondent they hear never did any actual reporting on
the story. The clues are subtle: usually the correspondent will end the piece with a dateline
of the bureau instead of the story site, or sign off with his name and news organization.
Many news executives say the decline of foreign coverage reflects dwindling pub-
lic interest in the world. Yet, last summer, when the Pew Research Center for the People
and the Press asked Americans what kind of news they follow “very closely,”14 percent
said international news, slightly more than consumer news (12 percent).xxviii
Broadcast Lobby
Broadcasters are widely considered one of the most wealthy, powerful, effective and feared
special interests in American politics. Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) has said, “They are the
most powerful lobby I have encountered in Washington.”xxix Even Newt Gingrich (R-
GA) refused to do battle with them when he was House Speaker, saying, “The practical
fact is, nobody’s going to take on the broadcasters.”xxx The broadcasting industry wields
enormous political clout for two reasons. First, it spends millions of dollars in campaign
donations and on high-powered lobbyists that work Congress, the administration and the
FCC. Secondly, broadcasters have control over something politicians value far more than
money: news coverage. Television and radio stations are an important presence in every
Congressional district and determine how politicians are portrayed to their voters. “Every
politician is afraid to take on the broadcast industry because of the perception that if you
cross the industry, you will not be invited to be a guest on the news and public affairs
programs,” said Jeff Chester, executive director of the Center for Digital Democracy.xxxi
The political influence of the industry’s trade group, the National Association of
Broadcasters (NAB), dates back to the earliest days of commercial radio. The NAB was
founded in 1922 by a small group of radio station owners who fought against music pub-
lishers for the right to play music on the air. (The music publishers feared radio airplay
would hurt sheet music and phonograph sales.) In 1934, the NAB helped defeat a provi-
sion of the Communications Act that would have required the FCC to set aside 25 per-
cent of the channels for nonprofit broadcasters. Today, the NAB has 6,000 members and
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represents 85 percent of network-owned and affiliated commercial television stations and
40 percent of all independent and public television stations in the U.S. It reportedly has
an annual operating budget of $48 million.xxxii Over the years, it has lobbied successfully
for laws and regulations that favor its members and against those that don’t. The follow-
ing section discusses some of the NAB’s most recent political victories.
A. Defeat of Torricelli Amendment 
The broadcast lobby’s most recent victory was the 2002 defeat of an amendment in the
landmark campaign finance legislation. The provision, authored by Sen. Robert Torricelli
(D-NJ), would have required television stations to offer candidates for federal office rock-
bottom prices for political advertising. It would also have prohibited stations from bump-
ing candidates’ ads if other advertisers wish to pay more. Television stations are already
legally required to offer candidates the same volume discount rates that they provide to
their best year-round product advertisers. But a study by the nonprofit advocacy group
Alliance for Better Campaigns found that nearly two-thirds of political candidates in the
2000 election paid more than the “lowest unit charge” rate, often because they wanted to
guarantee that their ads would not be bumped by another ad.xxxiii
Television broadcasters waged an all-out lobbying campaign against the Torricelli
amendment, fearing it could amount to hundreds of millions of dollars in lost ad rev-
enue. Within days of the amendment’s passage in the Senate, the NAB and its political
action committee began making major contributions to both political parties and mem-
bers of Congress. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the group gave
$15,000 apiece to the National Republican Congressional Committee and the
Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC). Two days later, it gave
$2,000 in soft money to the DCCC. Meanwhile, more than $60,000 in checks was dis-
tributed to House and Senate members.xxxiv
The lobbying apparently paid off.  While the Torricelli amendment passed in
the Senate, the House of Representatives voted 327-to-101 to strip the provision from its
campaign finance bill. At the industry’s annual convention in April, NAB president Eddie
Fritts called the measure’s defeat one of the NAB’s  “biggest achievements” and urged
broadcasters to remain united and vigilant against similar legislation in the future.xxxv
Torricelli is vowing to offer his amendment again. 
B. Free Airtime for Political Candidates
The broadcast lobby has also blocked any effort to require television stations to provide
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free airtime for political candidates. The United States is one of just a few countries in the
world that doesn’t require broadcasters to do this as a condition of receiving their govern-
ment licenses. Instead, stations are allowed to make millions of dollars by selling airtime
to candidates on the airwaves they have been given for free. As former Senator Bill
Bradley once said, “Today’s Senate campaigns function as collection agencies for broad-
casters. You simply transfer money from contributors to television stations.”xxxvi
In an effort to reform the campaign finance system, President Clinton in his
1998 State of the Union address directed the FCC to consider requiring broadcasters to
give airtime for political candidates for free or at a reduced cost. “The airwaves are a pub-
lic trust,” the president said, “and broadcasters also have to help us in this effort to
strengthen our democracy.”xxxvii The next day, then-FCC chairman William Kennard
announced that the FCC would develop new rules on political ads. But days later, accord-
ing to the Center for Public Integrity, “the powerful broadcast corporations and their
Capitol Hill allies managed to halt this historic initiative.” Then-Senate Commerce
Committee Chairman John McCain (R-AZ) and communications subcommittee chair-
man Conrad Burns (R-MT) accused the FCC of overstepping its authority and
announced they would kill the free airtime initiative. In addition, 17 House Republicans
sent a letter to Kennard, saying, “Only Congress has the authority to delegate to the
Commission programming obligations by broadcasters.” In the face of this full-court
press, Kennard backed down.xxxviii
C. Spectrum Giveaway
Arguably one of the NAB’s largest victories occurred in 1997, when the government gave
every television station a second channel on previously unused space on the publicly
owned spectrum.  This is in addition to the portion of the spectrum they already use for
analog transmission. To appreciate the magnitude of this gift and the power of the broad-
cast lobby, one must first understand the potential of digital broadcasting. 
In the 1980s, the U.S. and Japan were in a race to develop new broadcast tech-
nology called “high-definition” television, or HDTV, that would transmit super-sharp
pictures over the same analog channel. To encourage television stations to embrace
HDTV, the FCC set aside an unused portion of the spectrum for HDTV use. But then
digital technology was born and it was discovered that each channel could be split up to
six ways, able to handle cellular phones, paging devices and computer modems, as well as
television signals. In other words, a channel that was once limited to a single use—broad-
casting—now has multiple uses, thus enhancing its economic value. 
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The NAB lobbied Congress to include in the Telecommunications Act of 1996
provisions directing the FCC to grant licenses for the unused spectrum to existing broad-
casters. The NAB argued that giving every television station an extra channel would expe-
dite the transition from analog to digital television, which was considered critical to U.S.
economic competitiveness. It insisted that a second channel would allow stations to grad-
ually switch to digital services without shutting down their analog services and abandon-
ing people with conventional TV sets. The idea was simple: when all stations switched to
digital and most Americans had purchased new digital television sets or converters, broad-
casters would give back the spectrum that had been used for analog broadcasting and the
FCC would auction it off to the highest bidders. The process was expected to last any-
where from seven to ten years. 
The plan was controversial. Given the promise of digital, what the spectrum
broadcasters wanted free of charge was worth an estimated $70 billion at auction. In fact,
other industries had just paid $10 billion to use a far less valuable part of the spectrum
for activities such as wireless telephone communications. Some members of Congress,
including Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, said the broadcasters’ plan amounted to a
multi-billion-dollar giveaway. “This is a big, big corporate welfare project,” he said.xxxix
Initially, Dole held up passage of the Telecommunications Act over this issue, but he
eventually let the legislation proceed on the condition that Congress would revisit the
issue of whether the spectrum should be auctioned off instead of given away.
Shortly after the Telecommunications Act was passed, Congress held hearings on
whether to auction the new digital licenses. Some lawmakers advocated an auction as a
way to reduce the federal deficit. But broadcasters argued that without the free extra
channel, stations would be unwilling to risk investing millions of dollars in new equip-
ment needed to convert from analog to digital production and transmission. To rally pub-
lic support, the NAB launched a two-million dollar nationwide media blitz, warning con-
sumers that the survival of free television depended on getting the spectrum free and that
any spectrum auction would amount to a tax on TV. “Imagine your favorite shows…
gone,” warned a newspaper ad by KRON-TV, an NBC affiliate in San Francisco. “Local
news, weather and sports… gone… That’s what some in Congress have in mind.”xl
Amidst the debate, Dole resigned as Majority Leader and was replaced by
Senator Trent Lott (R-MS), a close friend and former college roommate of NAB president
Eddie Fritts. Within days of Lott’s election as leader, high-ranking members of Congress
directed the FCC to give free licenses for the digital spectrum to existing television sta-
tions. The agency began awarding the licenses the following year, allowing stations to use
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both channels simultaneously until 2006, or whenever 85 percent of American house-
holds are able to receive digital signals—whichever is later. At that time, the FCC would
reclaim the spectrum that was used for analog broadcasting and auction it off to other
kinds of users. 
Despite the enormous impact on consumers, the spectrum story generated very
little television news coverage. “It’s bad enough that broadcasters are being given both
digital and analog channels in perpetuity without paying money or in-kind,” observed
then-FCC chairman Reed Hundt. “Worse is that there have been no major televised dis-
cussions of the issue. The number one missing piece in the puzzle is, why wasn’t this story
about TV covered on TV?”xli
Now that spectrum is in short supply and its value has ballooned, some broad-
casters are offering to switch to digital now, if the FCC will let them sell or lease their sec-
ond channel in the open market for non-broadcast purposes, instead of giving it back to
government. Chairman Powell is considering the proposal as a way to free up valuable
spectrum.
Options for Reform
In the view of some critics, the current transition from analog broadcasting to digital
broadcasting presents a unique opportunity to overhaul the current regulatory scheme
and change the way broadcasters meet their public interest obligations. Digital technology
will expand broadcast capacity, allowing stations to broadcast up to six channels on the
same spectrum. The options debated by scholars and public interest advocates range from
strengthening the existing public trustee model to eliminating broadcasters’ public interest
obligations altogether in exchange for a fee. The challenge will be finding a model flexible
enough to accommodate the ever-changing technology and our commitment to First
Amendment values. 
A.  Strengthen Current Public Trustee Model
Seemingly, the easiest approach would be to maintain the current public interest obliga-
tions of broadcasters, and simply apply it to digital broadcasting. That means broadcasters
would continue to be required to air programming that serves the needs of their commu-
nities and the educational and informational needs of children. It’s unclear how the exist-
ing requirements would be applied in the digital world, which has yet to be established.
For example, if a broadcaster triples the amount of programming it offers by using multi-
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ple channels on the same spectrum, should it be required to triple its children’s program-
ming as well? 
Some argue that if the current public trustee model is retained, at least some
improvements in the situation should be made. They include restoring the Fairness
Doctrine and some form of ascertainment of community problems and needs. It might
also include strengthening the renewal process so the FCC and the public can more effec-
tively evaluate whether a licensee has met its public interest obligations. But even with
these improvements, critics say this approach leaves us saddled with a vague notion of the
“public interest” and simply continues a failed scheme. 
B. Spectrum Fee 
But there are some alternative strategies. The spectrum fee proposal, advocated by former
FCC general counsel Henry Geller, would relieve broadcasters of their public interest pro-
gramming obligations in exchange for a spectrum fee that would be used to support pub-
lic broadcasting. The fee would be based on a percentage of broadcasters’ revenues. This
would allow public broadcasters to eliminate underwriting and to be independent of
Congressional funding. After five years, the trust fund would be endowed and could
operate on interest. Thus, commercial broadcasters could bypass their public trustee
responsibilities, while the FCC would be relieved of its constitutionally sensitive role of
policing commercial television’s content. At the same time, public broadcasters would
have ample resources to provide high-quality public interest programming. “With this
plan commercial broadcasters don’t have to pretend that they are really putting public
interest ahead of profits,” said Geller.”xlii A major criticism of this proposal is that it seg-
regates public interest programming to noncommercial television, which not everyone
watches. Moreover, the spectrum fee might discourage the commercial television stations
that want to serve the public interest from doing so. 
C. Pay or Play 
Under the “Pay or Play” proposal, advocated by former FCC chairman Newton Minow,
broadcasters could chose to either meet their public trustee responsibilities or pay a fee to
get out of them each year. The fee would be a percentage of broadcasters’ annual rev-
enues—between one-and-three percent. Money generated from these fees would go to the
production of children’s programming on public television. The proposal lets broadcasters
who believe it is good for business and/or their community to serve the public interest
through programming continue to do so, but not require them to. Proponents say the
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“pay or play” proposal combines the best of the public trustee and spectrum fee models
with its simplicity and freedom of choice and could be the first step in testing whether
the public is better served by replacing public interest obligations with a payment. But
critics say the proposal continues the problems that currently exist with the public trustee
model, including the fact that public interest programming is hard to define and that it is
difficult to enforce. Others say the proposal destroys the foundation of public trusteeship
on which broadcasting is built and liken the idea to the Civil-War-era policy allowing
wealthy individuals to buy their way out of military service.
Conclusion
So what can the journalism community, in particular journalism educators, do to protect
the public interest in broadcasting and improve television news?  One short-term strategy
is to pressure the FCC to stop further media deregulation. The likely elimination of the
media ownership rules under FCC Chairman Powell threatens to usher in a tide of con-
solidation similar to, if not greater than, the wave created by the deregulatory rewrite of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996. So far, it has been largely left to media watchdogs
such as the Media Access Project and the Center for Digital Democracy to fight to retain
the ownership limits. Such groups say journalists could help by explaining to the FCC
how media policies affect journalism. “The link between consolidation and journalism is
still an underdeveloped issue,” said Jeff Chester, director of the Center for Digital
Democracy. “The journalism school deans could act as a moral force, calling for a mora-
torium on deregulation until these issues are discussed.”xliii
Another strategy is to educate citizens about their media rights. Many
Americans likely do not even know that they, the public, own the airwaves and have a
role in deciding how they are used. Moreover, much of the deregulation of the past few
decades and the lobbying role of the media industry have occurred out of public view.
“The crucial thing is to just make people aware of the fact that the media system is not
the result of natural law or the Ten Commandments,” said media historian Robert
McChesney. “It’s the result of explicit government policy made without the public’s
informed consent. Once the public is made aware of that, I think they will react strongly
because they will feel empowered.”xliv Mark Cooper, research director of the Consumer
Federation of America, said journalists can also help educate citizens about the public
value of journalism. “We need to convince citizens that there is a public good here that
needs to be defended,” said Cooper. xlv
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Given the fierce competitive pressures facing media companies, there seems no
easy solution to the clash between journalistic quality and profitability. But this critical
period of transition to digital broadcasting provides an opportunity to reexamine the pub-
lic interest obligations of broadcasters and to explore ways to ensure a place for serious
journalism in the new media marketplace. As Kennedy-appointed FCC Chairman
Newton Minow told broadcasters pointedly in 1961, “Never have so few owed so much
to so many.”
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annotated bibliography
By Craig L. LaMay
The U.S. broadcasting industry has generated a huge literature, most of it written after
1961, when then-FCC Chairman Newton Minow changed the way Americans, scholars
and policy makers thought about television and radio with his “Vast Wasteland” speech.
The definitive work on U.S. broadcasting is Eric Barnouw’s three-volume A History of
Broadcasting in the United States, later abridged into the single volume Tube of Plenty
(New York: Oxford Press, 1990). This bibliography, which is by no means exhaustive, is
intended to complement the discussion of public-interest regulation in U.S. broadcasting
to which it is attached. It represents a cross-section of the best thinking on the industry
by those across the political spectrum who have found deficiencies in the public interest
social contract that has governed the industry since 1927. The selections draw on the
work of journalists, law and communications scholars, policymakers, public interest advo-
cates, broadcast industry representatives, historians and economists. Someone who knew
nothing about the statutory and constitutional quirks that mark U.S. broadcasting could
quickly become expert by reviewing the materials listed below. 
The selections below are all focused on the curious nature of the regulatory
regime for broadcasting, its history and its continuation through the 1996
Telecommunications Act, despite consensus among critics across the spectrum of law and
politics who believe it has been a failure.
Aufderheide, Patricia. Communications Policy and the Public Interest: The
Telecommunications Act of 1996. New York: Guilford Press, 1999. This is a smart, easy-
to-read history and analysis of the 1996 Act, written by a journalist and communications
scholar. The book includes, as an appendix, a summary version of the Act written by
William and Mary Law School Dean Thomas Krattenmaker, noted below.
Firestone, Charles and Garmer, Amy Korzick. Digital Broadcasting and the Public
Interest. Washington, D.C.: Aspen Institute, 2000. Charles Firestone, the lead editor of
this volume, is a respected communications lawyer and scholar and now head of Aspen’s
Communications and Society program. This collection of essays from public interest
advocates and several broadcast industry lawyers, offers an array of views about how best
to apply the public interest standard in digital broadcasting. The volume is a useful
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adjunct to the 1998 Gore Commission report on the same topic. It is available online at
http://www.aspeninst.org/c&s/dbpi/dbpitoc.html.
Fowler, Mark S. and Brenner, Daniel L., “A Marketplace Approach to Broadcast
Regulation,” Texas Law Review, Vol. 60, 1982. This was FCC Chairman Fowler’s
famous policy statement in which he argued that the public interest is whatever interests
the public. It is also one of those works that everyone quotes but no one actually reads.
Fowler is not friendly to broadcasters but hostile to them, calling the public-interest stan-
dard a collection of “legal fictions” that broadcasters use to insulate themselves from com-
petition. He urges giving them “squatters’ rights” in their spectrum assignments, relieving
them of most content regulations, and having them pay a spectrum fee that could be used
to support public broadcasting and children’s programming. 
Geller, Henry. 1995-2005: Regulatory Reform for Principal Electronic Media.
Washington, D.C.: Northwestern Annenberg Center for Communications Policies
Studies, 1994. Geller was FCC general counsel first under Democrat Newton Minow
and then Republican Dean Burch, and served at the agency for two decades. He is proba-
bly the most knowledgeable and respected broadcast lawyer and scholar in the United
States, and he is the long-time proponent of the spectrum fee idea. Geller is the author of
several articles on broadcast law reform, but this article is a useful summary of his ideas.
The article is available online at http://www.annenberg.nwu.edu/pubs/geller/. 
Krattenmaker, Thomas and Powe, Lucas Jr., Regulating Broadcast Programming.
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1995. Both law professors and well-known critics of
broadcast regulation in the United States, Krattenmaker and Powe represent the conserva-
tive point of view on the subject. Like their counterparts on the left, such as Henry
Geller, the authors argue that the public trustee scheme for broadcasting has been a bust,
both as policy and as law, and argue for an end to all content regulation, lower entry bar-
riers to broadcasting, and treating broadcasters as common carriers whose principal pub-
lic-service obligation is to provide a range of speakers fair and equitable access to the pub-
lic airwaves.
McChesney, Robert, Telecommunications, Mass Media and Democracy: The Battle for
the Control of U.S. Broadcasting, 1928-1935. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Both a social commentator and a historian, McChesney is better in the latter role. This
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book is the definitive work on the politics of broadcast regulation, and the push for
reform, in the run-up to the passage of 1934 Communications Act. For a short, digestible
summary of the book, see McChesney, “Conflict, Not Consensus: The Debate Over
Broadcast Communication Policy, 1930-1935,” in Ruthless Criticism, ed. William
Solomon and Robert McChesney. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993.
Minow, Newton N. and LaMay, Craig L., Abandoned in the Wasteland: Children,
Television and the First Amendment. New York: Hill & Wang, 1995. This volume won
the American Bar Association’s Silver Gavel Award for best legal book of the year in 1995,
and its second chapter, “Whence the Stranger? The Elusive Public Interest” is an excellent
history of the development and application of the public interest standard. Further disclo-
sure: The writing of this book was funded by Carnegie Corporation of New York.
Public Interest Advisory Committee Report. Advisory Committee on Public Interest
Obligations of Digital Broadcasters. Washington, D.C., 1998. This is the so-called
“Gore Commission” report, commissioned by President Clinton to advise on the public
interest obligations of broadcasters as they move to digital transmission. The Committee’s
final report, available from the Benton Foundation, is available online at http://www.ben-
ton.org/PIAC/. While the report was criticized for being timid, it does have some good
recommendations, including several that reinstate old obligations abandoned in the last
two decades and several new ones. 
The Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees, Federal Communications
Commission, March 7, 1946. Reprinted in Documents of American Broadcasting, ed.
Frank J. Kahn. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1984, pp. 148-54. This is the so-
called “Blue Book,” discussed in the main body of this report. It was the most ambitious
effort the FCC ever carried out to make explicit the public interest obligations of broad-
casters. Broadcasters scorned the report and complained loudly of censorship and finan-
cial hardship. It did not help matters that the author of the Blue Book was Charles
Siepman, a former BBC executive whom industry critics assailed as a “socialist,” making
it very unlikely that a majority of FCC commissioners would support his recommenda-
tions. They did not, neither did Congress, and the FCC chairman who commissioned the
report quietly let it die. Though a penetrating analysis of the problems with American
broadcasting, the Blue Book had no effect whatsoever on broadcaster performance. 
Ward, Richard Somerset. Quality Time? The Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task
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Force on Public Television. New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1993. This is the
only book in this bibliography on public television, and it is valuable principally for the
excellent short history on the subject, prepared as background for the report’s otherwise
scattered recommendations, by Richard Somerset Ward. If nothing else, Ward’s report
serves as a caution for those who believe public broadcasting could or should carry the
weight of public service obligations without itself undergoing significant reforms.
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